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1 Introduction 
 
“I don't think the human race will survive the next thousand years,  
unless we spread into space” 
Prof. Stephen Hawking 
 
In 2008, the Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Prof. Paul Krugman for “[…] his analysis of trade 
patterns and location of economic activity”.1 The fact that the price was awarded in the field of economic 
geography, a subdivision of geography with a focus on economic activity, highlights the importance of 
space in economic research. Today, eleven years after Krugman’s award, the field of spatial data analysis 
has reached its maturity and became a widely used tool for economists. A review of the Econlit database 
for the last ten years, i.e. 2009 to 2019, shows that the number of published articles on spatial data analysis 
in the context of economics grew steadily. The literature review also identifies the most popular subjects 
that are concerned with spatial data analysis in economics. There is a total number of 644 published 
articles in academic journals on spatial data analysis, and in particular on spatial econometrics. The three 
most common subjects are studies on the size and spatial distribution of regional economic activity  
(113 articles), economic development, i.e. urban, rural, and regional analysis, housing and infrastructure 
(112 articles), regional economic activity such as growth, development, and environmental issues (110 
articles).  
Arbia (2011) conducts an extensive literature review on 237 papers concerning “spatial econometrics”. He 
finds that the number of applications and fields expanded in the period from 2007 to 2011. He also 
identifies the most common application of spatial econometric techniques in fields. Anselin (2010) points 
out that the increasing number of published papers, the general acceptance of spatial statistics & spatial 
econometrics, and the increasing variety of applications prove that these techniques have reached their 
maturity and obtained general acceptance among other economic methodologies. This trend is also visible 
in educational text books, such as Baltagi (2013), who has implemented an extensive chapter on spatial 
data analysis in the latest edition of textbook on econometric analysis.  
Why is there a rising interest in spatial data analysis among social scientists and why is it useful to consider 
geography in economic analysis? There are several answers to that question, however, data availability, 
                                                          
1 See: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2008/summary/ 
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rising interest in data visualisation, spatial pattern recognition, and spatial interactions as well as improved 
estimation techniques are among the most popular motivations. Over the last ten years, georeferenced 
economic and demographic data has become more available at finer aggregated levels. For instance, 
economic data, such as GDP or tax income, became increasingly available on regional aggregation levels 
such as districts and municipalities. Although this type of data had been available previously, the quality 
and sample sizes of the datasets have improved which is a necessary condition for meaningful spatial data 
analysis (Fischer and Getis, 2010). Obviously, data availability is a driving force for analytical tools such as 
spatial statistics, spatial econometrics, and data visualisation through maps. Especially maps have been 
used for centuries in order to simplify the world and understand geographical phenomena. Certainly this 
motivation is also true for economic issues.  
Data availability increased the interaction between economists, geographers, and regional scientists who 
initiated the development of spatial econometrics. A less romantic but very important motivation are 
improvements in estimation techniques which arise from spatial data analysis. For example, studying the 
spatial distribution of economic activity in the context of classic growth theory illustrates why spatial 
techniques are necessary to obtain consistent coefficient estimates. Figure 1.1 shows the regional 
distribution of absolute GDP growth in German districts. It illustrates that economic activity is not 
completely random, but clusters in certain regions. For example, regions with high GDP growth, i.e. “hot 
spots” are mostly observed in North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, and partly at the border to 
the Czech Republic. What leads to the geographical variation and clustering of GDP growth? Although the 
clustering of GDP can be partially explained by observable determinants from growth theory such as 
capital or labour supply, it cannot be fully explained by those determinants. In other words, even when 
these factors are implemented in the model, GDP clustering may still sustain and requires other techniques 
to obtain estimate consistency. One major motivation for spatial data analysis techniques is the omitted 
variable bias caused by existing spatial structures, which affect the values of the observations. Hence, it is 
essential for an applied economist who is studying the determinants of GDP, to consider the underlying 
spatial structure of the GDP distribution. In other words, excluding spatial structures from a georeferenced 
GDP growth regression will cause biased estimates (LeSage and Pace, 2009). Another motivation for spatial 
techniques are unobserved variables. For instance, innovation often results from regional knowledge 
transfers, which can be hard to quantify. Company founders in Silicon Valley benefit to a large extent from 
the regional knowledge transfer which makes the region particularly innovative. Regional knowledge 
transfer can be understood as unobserved positive spatial externalities which are not directly measurable 
by an independent variable.  
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Figure 1.1: Spatial distribution of economic activity in terms of regional GDP differences 
However, they can be quantified indirectly through spatial interaction terms. In other words, modelling 
the spatial dependence among regions with many innovative companies can be interpreted as technology 
transfer among those regions.  
The purpose of this work is to study spatial data analysis techniques and apply those techniques on social 
and economic issues. There are three examples of applied spatial data analysis in this work. Article one 
and two study the determinants of local supply differences in the market for election gambling machines. 
Article three studies the influence of immigration on local voting behaviour. This work is structured as 
follows, the rest of chapter one contains a general introduction on spatial data analysis techniques. 
Chapter two studies the influence of the socioeconomic milieu on the supply of electronic gambling 
machines (EGM). In chapter three, we study the supply determinants and spill over effects in the EGM 
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market. Chapter four studies the influence of immigration and other social factors on local voting 
behaviour in Germany. Finally, chapter five contains the discussion and some concluding remarks. 
 
1.1 Classification of Spatial Data Analysis 
Fischer and Getis (2010) provide a useful overview about different schools of thought in spatial data 
analysis. They distinguish between three categories of spatial data analysis, namely, (1) exploratory spatial 
data analysis, (2) spatial statistics, and (3) spatial econometrics. 
Exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) has its origins in the seventies and represents an extension of 
Tukey-type exploratory data analysis (EDA) with georeferenced data (Tukey, 1977). Tukey suggests that 
exploratory data analysis is a useful tool to get a sense for patterns in the data which can be used to 
develop research ideas and testable hypotheses. Typical instruments of non-spatial EDA are scatterplots 
as a preliminary stage to correlation analysis, boxplots for outlier identification, bar charts and histograms 
for distribution and dispersion analysis. In contrast to EDA, the purpose of ESDA is to isolate patterns and 
features in spatial data and illustrate those to the analyst. Simply speaking, ESDA adds a “spatial flavour” 
to traditional data analysis and introduces some new tools. For instance, ESDA uses maps to display data, 
transforms point data into surface data, aggregates smaller surface data to larger surfaces (e.g. assign 
counties to the corresponding state), and illustrates changes over time in attributes of these surfaces. One 
key strength of ESDA is data visualisation, mostly through maps, which can motivate and facilitate an 
understanding of otherwise complex issues. Mapping georeferenced data can make difficult topics more 
accessible, illustrate spatial distributions, and make statistics overall more vibrant. A large share of ESDA 
is used prior to spatial statistics and spatial econometrics. Therefore, ESDA can be considered as a 
preparatory step to modelling. Fischer and Getis (2010) argue that ESDA and EDA represent a recent trend 
in research methodology. The traditional six-steps of hypothesis testing – (1) problem, (2) hypothesis, (3) 
sampling distribution, (4) testing, (5) results, and (6) discussion have been extended by a seventh step, 
namely data exploration. However, they argue that data exploration is not a step that is squeezed in 
between the other steps. Instead, the data exploration should accompany the six-steps at nearly all stages 
of the scientific process. 
Spatial statistics has its roots in Pearson and Fisher. Their analysis was extended to a spatial framework 
by Whittle, Moran, Geary, Cliff and Ord. Especially Whittle (1954), Moran (1950), and Geary (1954) were 
pioneers in the development of autocorrelation analysis with georeferenced data. Spatial statistics is 
mostly concerned with problems regarding spatial entities such as points, lines, areas, or a combination of 
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these three. Most importantly, these spatial units usually represent real world phenomena, which makes 
this science interesting for applied economists. For instance, point data can be used to model and map 
single spatial entities such as houses or firm locations. Lines are used to model the presence of roads or 
borders. Whereas areas can either be “real” areas, i.e. areas which are physically present and distinctive, 
such as forests and cities. Alternatively, areas can also have an administrative character, which means they 
are areas by definition rather than physical criteria (e.g. municipalities, states, countries, or common trade 
zones). Typical research questions in spatial statistics include conjectures about the spatial distribution of 
geographical entities, pattern in the spatial distribution such as clustering or dispersion, differences in the 
patterns, spatial relationships, and most importantly, the interaction between the defined points, lines, 
and areas over time and space. Besides the interaction among spatial entities, the interaction among 
attributes of the spatial entities is at the core of spatial statistics. Consider two spatial entities, Germany 
and France, which have GDP as a common attribute. Spatial statistics can be used to map the GDP growth 
at the border of these two countries and help studying growth externalities among both entities. Two of 
the mostly used tools from spatial statistics are spatial dependence measures and spatial weight matrices 
Drukker et al. (2013a, 2013b). The former measures the similarity or dissimilarity among spatial entities 
while the latter describes how the entities are connected with each other (e.g. neighbours). The most 
common spatial dependence measures are Moran’s I and Geary’s C statistics (Moran, 1950; Geary, 1954). 
Both measures are hypothesis tests for spatial randomness, which is an essential prerequisite for spatial 
econometric models. Spatial matrices will be discussed in section 1.2 and spatial dependence measures in 
section 1.3. 
Spatial Econometrics is a rather new field in the history of scientific thought. The term was introduced in 
1974 by Jean Paelinck at the annual meeting of the Dutch Statistical Association (Arbia, 2016). Compared 
to more general econometrics, spatial econometrics can be considered a rather new field. With the rise of 
computer technology in the eighties, followed by theories on economic geography in the nineties, and the 
availability of spatial big data in the first years of the new millennium, the interest in spatial econometric 
techniques rose steadily. Throughout the Post-Millennium years, the discipline’s development had gained 
momentum and established in the mainstream sciences (Arbia, 2011). Traditional spatial econometric 
theory was formulated in the late seventies and manifests in two textbooks by Paelinck and Klaassen 
(1979) and Anselin (1988). Both books are still considered the “bibles” for spatial econometricians and 
establish some of the most commonly used tools in the field such as the spatial lag model (SLM) and the 
spatial error model (SEM). Both models are similar to linear regression models with the main distinction 
being the presence of spatial dependence. For example, the SLM model assumes a non-randomness in the 
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distribution of the dependent variable while the SEM model assumes the same for the error term. Both 
models incorporate dependencies among spatial entities in different ways. In addition to the “bibles”, the 
book by LeSage and Pace (2009) is considered as one of the most important extension to Paclinck, Klaassen 
and Anselin. LeSage and Pace provide an overview on models, which incorporate more than one spatial 
interaction. They are proponents of the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), which incorporates a spatial structure 
in the dependent variable and the independent variables simultaneously. Spatial econometrics builds upon 
ESDA and spatial statistics, which makes it sometimes difficult to separate the fields. For instance, ESDA is 
useful to visualise economic activity and detect patterns, spatial statistics helps quantifying those patterns, 
and spatial econometrics is ultimately used for more distinct analytics.  
When it comes to applied spatial econometrics, there is vast number of literature, which incorporate those 
techniques into different computer programs. Fischer and Getis (2010) show a variety of applications in 
different programs, such as ArcGIS, SAS, R, GeoDa, Python, and others. LeSage and Pace (2009) present 
some MatLab procedures, Anselin and Rey (2014) provide an extensive overview on their own open-source 
software GeoDa, and Arbia (2014) illustrates the main procedures in R. In this work, I mostly work with the 
procedures by Drukker et al. (2013a, 2013b), who incorporate spatial econometric techniques in STATA. 
The aim of this work is to explore these techniques in economic applications, however, I will put a higher 
emphasis on spatial econometrics. Spatial econometric models will be discussed in section 1.3 and 1.4. 
 
1.2 Spatial Weight Matrices 
One aim of spatial data analysis is the exploration of global and local patterns. A crucial aspect to study 
these patterns is the definition of relevant “neighbourhood”. Fischer and Wang (2011) define neighbours 
as spatial units which interact with each other in a meaningful way. This definition leaves some room for 
interpretation, because “meaningful interaction” depends on the research field itself. For example, real 
estate economists are often interested in spatial point data such as living houses, hospitals, factories, etc. 
They usually want to study the influence of local amenities such as schools, stores, train stations, and 
hospitals on rents and house prices. One common definition of neighbourhood for real estate economists 
is distance. Distance itself can be defined in two ways - first in terms of the Euclidean distance, and second, 
in terms of other abstract distance units (e.g. travel time or transaction costs). For instance, residents could 
consider a school in range of 800 metres radius as their neighbourhood because their children are more 
likely to visit it than another school which is five kilometres away.  
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Alternatively, a more abstract distance measure such as travel time could also be a reasonable definition. 
For example, if the school lying further away can be reached within the same time due to better public 
transportation infrastructure, it can also be considered as neighbourhood. On the other hand, economists, 
and in particular spatial econometricians, are often interested in local GDP or local unemployment 
variation. Whether a single household is producing more output might be not too important for an 
economist, but the output growth of a certain state is of key interest. As a consequence, spatial 
econometricians often work with administrative units, i.e. spatial area data, and require other definitions 
of neighbourhood. One typical question of interest for economists are spillover-effects in output growth 
across states. In other words: how does growth in one state affect the growth in neighbouring state? The 
distance definition might not be too helpful for this kind of question because states differ in shape and 
size which causes some inaccuracy. The “common border” definition, i.e. areas that share a common 
border are neighbours, proves more helpful. There are also other fields which abstract from physical 
distance measures entirely. For example, network analysis uses neighbourhood structures in terms of 
“connections” between users. Social networks, such as Facebook, consider two users as neighbours if they 
are connected with each other, i.e. they are “friends” within the system.  
The aforementioned examples can be summarised by three types of neighbourhood definitions. That is (1) 
common border or contiguity, (2) the (inverse) distance definition and (3) the k-nearest neighbours 
definition. In spatial data analysis, the neighbourhood structure of spatial entities is nested within a spatial 
weights matrix 𝑊𝑊, defined as 
𝑊𝑊 = �𝑤𝑤11 𝑤𝑤12 ⋯ 𝑤𝑤1𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤21 𝑤𝑤22 ⋯ 𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛1 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛2 ⋯ 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
� 
Index 𝑛𝑛 represents the number of observations. For instance, if we are interested in studying 
municipalities, then 𝑛𝑛 represents the total number of municipalities in the sample. Hence, 𝑖𝑖 stands for one 
municipality and 𝑗𝑗 for another municipality. The single elements 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represent the bilateral neighbourhood 
relation between two entities 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. The diagonal values of 𝑊𝑊 characterise the neighbourhood 
relationship of each spatial entity to itself, while the off-diagonal elements represent the neighbourhood 
relationship to all other spatial entities. The diagonal values can be interpreted as an internal restriction, 
barrier or resistance within the spatial unit itself. In economics, they are usually of little interest and set to 
zero by assumption. However, there are some examples where the diagonal elements are unequal to zero, 
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but they are usually considered special cases.2 The rows and columns of 𝑊𝑊 are symmetric for most 
applications. The symmetry of the matrix ensures that the inverse matrix 𝑊𝑊−1 exists, which is required for 
most spatial regression analysis. Symmetry also ensures that the neighbourhood structures are bilateral. 
For example, if Germany is neighbour to France, then France is also neighbour to Germany. Although this 
is a weak assumption, the spatial weights matrix is able to model unilateral neighbourhood structures as 
well. Further, 𝑊𝑊 is often assumed to be exogenous which means that the neighbourhood structure is 
known and static. In most applications, an exogenous spatial weights matrix is a reasonable assumption. 
For instance, the borders of administrative units, such as states or municipalities, do not change frequently 
and do not require dynamic modelling of the spatial weight matrix. As spatial econometricians work at the 
scope of countries, states, or municipalities, complex neighbourhood structures and endogenous matrices 
are usually not required. In contrast, Gibbons and Overman (2012) argue, that the assumption of 
exogenous spatial weights matrix leads to biased estimates, if the true matrix is endogenous. However, 
there is also literature that puts emphasis on endogenous spatial weights matrices (Ahrens and 
Bhattacharjee, 2015).  
Different neighbourhood structures, i.e. contiguity, distance, and k-nearest neighbours, are achieved by 
distinct formalisations of the single element 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. First, the common border or spatial contiguity is 
particularly useful for the analysis of economic or administrative areas. It is defined as follows 
   𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 1       if area 𝑖𝑖 shares a border with area 𝑗𝑗0       𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                                                       
The contiguity definition is binary, i.e. the values of the matrix can be either one or zero. The single element 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is equal to zero if areas 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 do not share a common border. If they share a common border, the 
value is equal to one and both spatial entities are considered neighbours.  
Second, both areas 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 may be considered neighbours when the distance 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is less than a certain 
threshold, say 𝑑𝑑. This definition leads to distance-based spatial weights, formalised as 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 1     if 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝑑𝑑; and 𝑑𝑑 > 00    otherwise                       
For area and line data, the distance-based definition requires centroids, i.e. the central location of each 
area unit. The centroids are calculated from longitude and latitude data for each area. The straight-line 
determines the shortest distance between two point locations, i.e. centroids, in a flat plane, whereby 
                                                          
2 For example this is usually the case when intra-entity distances or barriers are modelled such as travel distance 
within a municipality. 
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longitude and latitude are treated as coordinates within the plane. If the Euclidean distance between two 
centroids lies within the threshold, both areas are considered neighbours.  
The third popular definition of neighbourhood considers the k-nearest neighbours. It is particularly useful, 
when spatial entities are too far away to be modelled by a reasonable distance definition, or they don’t 
have a common border. A typical example for these entities are islands, for example the Canary Islands 
belong to Spain but are rather far away and don’t have a common border with Spain. Nonetheless, there 
is social and economic interaction between the entities. The k-nearest neighbour matrix takes the form  
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 1     if centroid of 𝑗𝑗 is one of the 𝑘𝑘 nearest centroids to that of 𝑖𝑖0     otherwise                                                                                            
It is evident that all three definitions of the spatial weight matrices are derived from the same spatial 
layout and that the choice of different spatial weights matrices can affect the outcome of the analysis. 
Hence, spatial statistics and spatial econometrics is evidently conditional on the choice of a spatial weight 
matrix. On the other hand, the choice of the spatial weight matrix should not be too overemphasised, 
because differences in estimates based on spatial weights matrix are also limited (Wang, Kockelmann and 
Wang, 2013).  
 
1.3 Spatial Autocorrelation 
Once the neighbourhood structure is defined, it can be used to study patterns in georeferenced data. An 
important tool and prerequisite for regression analysis is spatial autocorrelation (spatial dependence and 
spatial interaction are used synonymously) which determines how a variable is correlated with itself 
through space (auto meaning self). It helps detecting patterns, i.e. similarity or disparity, in nearby spatial 
entities. Fischer and Wang (2011) define spatial autocorrelation as “the correlation among observations of 
a single variable […] strictly attributable to the proximity of those observations in geographic space”. In 
other words, spatial autocorrelation describes whether near things are more similar (or dissimilar) to each 
other than distant things. This definition is imbedded in Tobler’s first law of geography, which states that 
“everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler, 
1970). Measures for spatial autocorrelation work with two types of information. First, similarity among 
locations, i.e. proximity, and second, similarity of the values of a single variable across observations, i.e. 
similarity. For example, when studying GDP externalities, the first type contains information about 
proximity among the areal units, and the second type contains information about similarity in GDP among 
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areal units. The central aspect of the spatial autocorrelation is the cross product between both types of 
information which can be described by a simple model 
 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖   the value of the variable of interest for region 𝑖𝑖 
 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the similarity of 𝑖𝑖’s and 𝑗𝑗’s location (proximity) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  the similarity of 𝑖𝑖’s and 𝑗𝑗’s variable values (similarity) 
The measures of spatial autocorrelation are differentiated by the scale and scope of the research question. 
It can be distinguished between global and local measures. Global spatial autocorrelation combines both 
types of information, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and generates a cross product for all observations while local 
autocorrelation considers a subset of the sample. Global spatial autocorrelation is defined as 
��𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Multiplying each element of matrix 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 with each element of matrix 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and summing, results in a scalar. 
The scalar is an average for similarity (or dissimilarity) of variable values in proximate spatial areas. In 
practice, the similarity of variable values 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  depends on the scaling of the data. For nominal variables, 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  takes the value of one if 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 are equal, and zero otherwise. For ordinal variables, the similarity of 
values is based on the ranking of 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. The most common measure for global spatial autocorrelation 
with interval variables is Moran’s I statistics. It is based on the cross-product  (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 − 𝑧𝑧̅)(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 − 𝑧𝑧̅), with 𝑧𝑧̅ being the average of the 𝑧𝑧-values. Moran’s I statistics was introduced by Moran 
(1950) and further developed by Cliff and Ord (1973, 1981). It takes the form 
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑛𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖−?̅?𝑧)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖−?̅?𝑧)
∑ (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖−?̅?𝑧)2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1    ;    𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗  
The test statistics is a two-tailed test and assumes spatial randomness under the null hypothesis. If the null 
hypothesis sustains, there is no spatial autocorrelation, which indicates that space does not matter for the 
distribution of variable values. The alternative hypothesis is the existence of positive or negative spatial 
autocorrelation. Similar to Pearson’s correlation, the value of the test statistics can either be negative or 
positive. The statistics ranges from [−1; 1], which makes it straightforward to interpret. Positive values of 
Moran’s I indicate that similar variable values are located in close proximity. For example, in terms of GDP, 
positive autocorrelation indicates, that high GDP areas neighbour other high GDP areas. Hence, positive 
spatial autocorrelation can be interpreted as a measure for spatial clustering of similar values of a single 
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variable. On the other hand, negative spatial autocorrelation indicates that variable values fluctuate in 
neighbouring locations. This means, a high value is likely to be neighbouring a low value of the same 
variable and vice versa. In other words, an area with high GDP is neighbour to an area with low GDP, and 
vice versa. Figure 1.2 illustrates both types of spatial autocorrelation for a binary variable. The left-hand 
side demonstrates a concentration of similar values in the upper left corner (blue) and the bottom right 
corner (white).  
 
Figure 1.2: Positive spatial autocorrelation (left) and negative spatial autocorrelation (right) 
 
The right hand side illustrates the dispersion (checkerboard pattern) of similar values in space. In practice, 
positive spatial autocorrelation can be interpreted as spatial clustering of similar values and negative 
autocorrelation indicates spatial diffusion of similar values. Figure 1.3 illustrates the unemployment rate 
for the working population among German districts (Stadt- & Landkreise). The unemployment rate is 
divided into eight quantiles. Regions with high unemployment rates cluster in eastern Germany and the 
Ruhr area in western Germany forming two “hot spots”. Low unemployment rates are mainly observed in 
the wealthy south of Germany and form one large “cold spot”. Moreover, the unemployment rate 
transitions smoothly from high rates to average to low rates, which is another indicator for positive global 
spatial autocorrelation. Moran’s I statistics confirms the visual inspection and quantifies the degree of 
similarity and proximity. Table 1.1 indicates a positive and highly significant spatial autocorrelation with a 
Moran’s I value of 0.623. 
Table 1.1: Moran’s I statistic for the unemployment rate 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛’𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 (𝐼𝐼) 𝑧𝑧 − 𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒 
     
unemployment rate 0.623 *** 0.031 20.431 0.000 
     
***0.1% significant ; ** 1% significant; * 5% significant 
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Figure 1.3: Spatial clustering in the unemployment rate among German districts for the year 2016. 
 
Note that Moran’s I considers the transition from the “hot spots” to “cold spots” because the statistic 
determines the scalar for the whole population. In contrast, local spatial autocorrelation measures, such 
as Geary’s C, treat each hot (or cold) spot separately without necessarily considering links between them 
(Cliff and Ord, 1981). Strictly speaking, local spatial autocorrelation treats each cluster as an independent 
entity. Hence, the choice between global and local measures depends on the scope of the research 
question. While global spatial autocorrelation helps detecting clusters, local spatial autocorrelation is a 
better fitting tool to study and explain certain local clusters. Since local spatial autocorrelation measures 
are not the main emphasis of this work, I will further use global- and “regular” spatial autocorrelation 
synonymously.  
13 
 
1.4 Spatial Econometric Models 
Exploratory spatial data analysis and spatial statistics are preliminary steps to more quantitative modelling 
which seeks to establish a relationship between several variables while also accounting for spatial 
dependence. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the most common spatial econometric 
models for a cross-section data framework. For didactical purposes, it is useful to follow a “general to 
specific” approach, which means starting with the most general spatial model, i.e. the Manski model, and 
deriving all other models from it. The Manski model incorporates three possible types of spatial 
interactions (Manski, 1993; Elhorst, 2010). It incorporates (1) endogenous interactions, i.e. spatial 
dependence in the dependent variable, (2) exogenous interactions, i.e. spatial dependence in the 
independent variables, and (3) spatial interactions in the error term. The Manski model is defined as 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 + 𝑣𝑣 
𝑣𝑣 = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑣𝑣 + 𝜀𝜀 
Y is an N x 1 vector for the dependent variable where N is the total number of observations. It contains 
one observation of the dependent variable for each unit in the sample (𝑖𝑖 =  1, … ,𝑁𝑁). X is a N x K vector 
of explanatory variables with the corresponding K x 1 parameter vector 𝑋𝑋. The N x N symmetric spatial 
weights matrix is represented by W, and u is an independent and identically distributed N x 1 error term 
for all 𝑖𝑖. There are three types of spatial interaction effects included in the Manski model: first, 𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌 is the 
endogenous interaction effect, i.e. the effect of the neighbouring area’s dependent variable. Second, 𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋 
is the exogenous interaction effect between the independent variables, and third, 𝑊𝑊𝑣𝑣 is the spatial 
interaction among the error terms of different spatial entities. The corresponding coefficients of the spatial 
interactions are denoted as 𝜆𝜆, 𝑊𝑊, and 𝜌𝜌, respectively. 𝜆𝜆 denotes the spatial autoregressive coefficient. It 
can be interpreted as the average influence of the neighbouring dependent variables on the location of 
interest. 𝑊𝑊 represents a K x 1 vector of parameters, similar to 𝑋𝑋. The single coefficients of vector 𝑊𝑊 
represent the mean spill-over-effects of neighbouring independent variables on the dependent variable 
at the location of interest. While 𝜌𝜌 is the error autocorrelation coefficient. The Manski model is not 
particularly useful in empirical applications because the estimated coefficients cannot be clearly separated 
from each other. As a result, estimated coefficients from the Manski model will be biased. Nonetheless, 
the model is helpful for illustrating the hierarchy of spatial models, because all other cross-section models 
are nested in it. For instance, setting any of the three spatial interaction coefficients equal to zero, i.e. 𝜆𝜆, 𝑊𝑊, 
and 𝜌𝜌, will result in another model. For instance, setting  𝑊𝑊 and 𝜌𝜌 to zero results in the spatial lag model 
(SLM), which is defined as 
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𝑌𝑌 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑣𝑣 
If 𝜆𝜆 and 𝑊𝑊 equal zero, the outcome will be the spatial error model (SEM), formally 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑣𝑣 
𝑣𝑣 = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑣𝑣 + 𝜀𝜀 
If only one interaction is set to zero, say 𝜌𝜌, the result will be the Spatial Durbin model (SDM)  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 + 𝑣𝑣 
Setting all spatial coefficients, 𝜆𝜆,𝑊𝑊, and 𝜌𝜌, to zero will result in the standard OLS model. Table 1.2 
summarises all combinations of spatial interactions and the resulting model for cross-section data. The 
Manski model is the most general model and nests six spatial models, i.e. SLM, SEM, SDM, KPM, SDE, SLX, 
plus the OLS model. The spatial lag model and spatial error model are considered the two most important 
“classical” spatial models and were established by Anselin (1988). Both models include one type of spatial 
interaction effect: The spatial lag model contains a spatially lagged dependant variable, while the spatial 
error model establishes a spatial autoregressive process in the error term. Both models were – and still 
are – considered workhorse models in spatial econometrics. 
Table 1.2: Spatial interaction models for cross-section data 
Model Independent interaction 
 (𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌) Dependent interaction  (𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋) Error term interaction  (𝑊𝑊𝑣𝑣) 
Manski model √ √ √ 
Spatial Durbin model (SDM) √ √ - 
Kelejian-Prucha model (KPM) √ - √ 
Spatial Durbin error model (SDE) - √ √ 
Spatial lag model (SLM) √ - - 
Spatial error model (SEM)  - - √ 
Spatial lag in X (SLX) - √ - 
OLS - - - 
 
During the last ten years, interest has grown in models which contain more than one spatial interaction. 
Based on Anselin’s work, the Kelejian-Prucha model (KPM) combines two spatial interaction effects, i.e. 
spatial interaction in the dependent variable and the error term, in model. The foundation for KPM was 
laid by Kelejian, Prucha (1998) and later emphasised by Harry Kelejian at the 2007 Annual Spatial 
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Econometric conference. In contrast to the classical models with one type of spatial dependence, the 
Kelejian-Prucha model allows for more efficient estimates and outperforms the SLM and SEM model. In 
the same year, James LeSage highlighted the advantages of models with spatially lagged independent 
variables. He introduced the Spatial Durbin model (SDM), which incorporates a spatial structure in the 
dependent variable and the independent variables at the North American Meeting of the Regional Science 
Association in 2007. The mathematical foundation for the Spatial Durbin model can be found in the work 
by LeSage and Pace (2009). The authors argue that the Spatial Durbin model is the most versatile spatial 
model for cross-section data because it fits to a larger share of empirical applications due its robustness. 
To be precise, the Spatial Durbin model produces unbiased coefficient estimates, even if the true data 
generating process is the SLM or SEM model. In order to shed some light on the model selection, the next 
session will discuss some basic decision rules for spatial econometric models. 
 
1.5 Model Selection 
Ultimately, a spatial econometric model should serve two purposes. First, a model should fit the scope of 
a research question, i.e. it should be consistent with the research motivation. Second, the model should 
be specified correctly, i.e. minimise coefficient bias and increase coefficient efficiency. The spatial 
interactions, which were introduced previously, serve both purposes. Especially spatial interactions in the 
endogenous and exogenous variables are often the key interest because they can help understanding 
spatial spill-over-effects and externalities. On the other hand, spatial interactions in the error term serve 
primarily to increase estimation efficiency (Anselin, 1988). Model selection in cross section spatial 
econometrics is mostly concerned with two questions. First, is a spatial model necessary or is a non-spatial 
model sufficient? Second, which spatial model is the most useful choice in terms of answering the research 
motivation? Whether a model is a spatial model or a non-spatial model ultimately depends on the 
existence of spatial dependence. If a variable does not depend on the spatial distribution of the 
observations, a spatial model will not improve the estimates over a non-spatial model like OLS. Hence, 
tests for spatial dependence are necessary to determine whether a spatial model or a non-spatial model 
is used.  
LeSage and Pace (2009) argue that the costs of misspecification are highest, if the spatial dependence in 
the dependent variable is ignored. Therefore, most tests for spatial dependence focus on the parameter 
𝜆𝜆 which is the corresponding coefficient to the spatial lag 𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌. A great share of the literature focuses on 
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the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics, which requires two components: (1) the least squares residuals 
𝑒𝑒, and (2) a spatial weights matrix 𝑊𝑊 (Burridge, 1980). The LM statistics is defined as 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀 = �𝑒𝑒′𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒′𝑒𝑒
𝑛𝑛
�
2 / 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑊𝑊2 + 𝑊𝑊′𝑊𝑊) 
The LM test is based on Moran’s I test statistics and has a similar purpose. It can be used in a t-test setting 
where the null hypothesis assumes no existence of spatial dependence. For example if we are interested 
whether a model is a spatial lag model, the null hypothesis will be 𝐻𝐻0:𝜆𝜆 = 0. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, there is spatial structure in the dependent variable and the SLM model is a likely choice. This test 
can also be used to test independent variables and the error term for spatial dependence. Since the test 
depends purely on OLS residuals and a spatial weights matrix, the test is considered rather simple. 
However, the major drawback of the LM test is its inability to distinguish several spatial interactions at 
once. The test is restricted to one type of spatial dependence at a time. For example, the test can be also 
used to study spatial interactions in the error term. However, it will then ignore potential presence of 
spatial dependence in 𝑌𝑌. In other words, the test is useful to detect spatial dependence, but not 
particularly useful to determine which model describes the true data generating process best.  
Therefore, LeSage and Pace (2009) propose that model selection should not be purely based on test 
statistics, but rather on rational considerations about the costs of misspecification. They argue, that the 
cost of ignoring spatial dependence in 𝑌𝑌 is relatively high, because it results in biased coefficients. On the 
other hand, ignoring spatial dependence in the error term will bear fewer costs because it results in lower 
efficiency, with which it is easier to deal. One major reason why the authors consider inefficiency as not 
too big of a concern are improvements in data availability over the last years. The average sample size for 
spatial data has increased and with larger spatial datasets, efficiency may be less concerning compared to 
bias. They argue that bias also sustains with larger samples. Hence, ignoring spatial dependence in 𝑌𝑌 can 
be considered more “costly” in comparison to spatial dependence in the error term. Based on that 
reasoning, LeSage and Pace (2009) propose four model selection criteria.  
1. If the true DGP is a SEM model, i.e. there is spatial dependence in the error term, using SLM, KPM 
and SDM models will produce unbiased but inefficient coefficients. 
2. If the true DGP is a SLM model, i.e. with spatial dependence in the dependent variable, using SEM 
will produce biased coefficients due to the omitted variable bias. KPM, SDM will produce unbiased 
coefficients.  
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3. If the true DGP is a SDM model, i.e. with spatial structure in the dependent and the independent 
variables, then SLM, SEM and KPM will suffer from omitted variable bias, since all models exclude 
the spatial interaction of the independent variables, 𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋. However, SEM will be even more biased 
because it also excludes the spatial interaction in the dependent variable 𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌.  
4. If the true DGP is a KPM model, i.e. with spatial structure in the dependent variable and the error 
term, SLM and SDM will compute unbiased coefficients but will lack some efficiency. On the other 
hand, SEM will produce biased coefficients. 
Unfortunately, the authors do not explicitly consider the SLX and SDE model in their comparison. However, 
the SDM model produced unbiased coefficients even if the true DGP is the SLX model. If the true DGP is a 
SDE model, then the SDM model produces unbiased but inefficient coefficients. In conclusion, out of the 
six spatial models, the SDM model is the only model which is able to produce unbiased coefficients. Yet in 
some cases, it remains inefficient. Another advantage of the SDM model is its simultaneous consideration 
of spatial structure in the dependent and the independent variable. One major motivation for applying 
spatial models are unobserved spatial interactions, such as regional spill-overs. Modelling spatial 
interactions in the dependent and the independent variable at the same time, is the most extensive 
approach to account for unobserved effects.  
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Abstract 
In Germany, gambling research has primarily focused on the broader population in prevalence studies, 
neglecting the importance and influence of the local socioeconomic context in the development and 
maintenance of gambling disorders. To analyze the interplay between contextual and compositional 
factors in the market for electronic gambling machines (EGMs) in Germany, we assessed the EGM densities 
and socioeconomic deprivation in 244 local communities within Baden-Wuerttemberg. Our results suggest 
that EGM density is statistically associated with 3 socioeconomic determinants: The shares of migrants, 
unemployed, and high-school-educated people in the communities are statistically significant variables in 
our linear regression model, whereas younger age, male gender, and marital status exhibit no statistical 
associations with EGM density. The share of unemployed people is the only variable of statistical and 
practical significance. Our analysis advocates area-based policy measures to minimize gambling-related 
harm. By decreasing EGM densities in communities with high levels of unemployment, we expect to 
protect at-risk population strata that are most vulnerable to gambling exposure. 
  
                                                          
3 This article has been originally published as: Xouridas, S., Jasny, J., and Becker, T. (2016). „An ecological approach 
to electronic gambling machines and socioeconomic deprivation in Germany“. Journal of Gambling Issues, 33: 82-
102.  
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2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the German market for electronic gambling machines (EGMs) has increased by a 
respectable amount: From 2009 to 2013, the absolute number of EGMs increased from 233,000 to 
263,000, while the total turnover of the gaming machine industry increased from 4,965 to 5,550 billion 
euros (Vieweg, 2013). In Germany, gambling is generally regulated at the federal state level. Authorities in 
the federal states govern the sectors of lotteries, sports betting, and casinos. EGM gambling in gaming 
halls, restaurants, and bars is subject to the federal laws of the German Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung) 
and the Gambling Ordinance (Spielverordnung). In 2006, the fifth amendment of the Gambling Ordinance 
considerably improved the framework conditions of gaming operators and increased the incentives for 
individuals to gamble at EGMs. This was achieved primarily by introducing an accelerated game with higher 
stakes, profits, and losses. The negative effects of problematic gambling have been recognized as a public 
health concern by public authorities, and legislators have enacted a new regulatory framework to prevent 
the development of gambling disorders, the 2008 Interstate Treaty on Gambling 
(Glücksspielstaatsvertrag). The federal states revised the Interstate Treaty in 2012 
(Glücksspieländerungsstaatsvertrag) to implement a more consistent gambling law to include legislative 
measures for the EGM sector. 
Erbas and Buchner (2012) have shown that the quantity of inpatient and outpatient treatments for 
pathological gambling in Germany has increased significantly during the last decade. However, increased 
treatment seeking for pathological gambling may not be exclusively attributable to increased gambling 
availability. The rise in the number of treatment-seeking individuals can also be explained by increased 
awareness of the dangers associated with gambling. The public has been made aware of the dangers by 
mass media campaigns and by labels and warnings on gambling tickets. The Federal Centre of Health 
Education (BZgA) provides a nationwide telephone helpline and Internet self-help programs to counsel on 
problematic gambling behavior. To advertise lotteries, providers have been legally obligated since 2008 to 
provide gambling addiction warnings and telephone helplines for those who want confidential advice. 
Furthermore, legal regulations require operators to display information leaflets on problematic gambling 
in gaming halls, and EGMs are required to display a telephone helpline linked to the BZgA. All of the above-
mentioned measures have increased public awareness of gambling and produced a profound effect on 
treatment-seeking rates. In response, some federal states have started to finance specialized counseling 
centers for pathological gamblers (Buchner et al., 2015). 
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Multiple epidemiological studies in Germany have provided estimates of the proportion of pathological 
and problematic gamblers. Large community-based epidemiological studies that reported gambling 
prevalence rates for Germany were conducted by Bühringer, Kraus, Sonntag, Pfeiffer-Gerschel, and Steiner 
(2007) and Buth and Stöver (2008); other notable studies in this context include periodic studies from the 
BZgA (Haß, Orth, & Lang 2012), a study by Sassen et al. (2011), and the study of Pathological Gambling and 
Epidemiology (PAGE) conducted by Meyer et al. (2011).  
To give an overview of the German gambling market, we will briefly discuss the BZgA studies. They were 
the only repeated cross-sectional analyses in Germany (BZgA, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014). The four 
population-wide representative studies were conducted in the years 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013 and 
assessed gambling behavior and gambling-associated attitudes and problems in the population aged 16 to 
65 years. By using random digit-dial sampling, the study investigators collected data by means of 
computer-assisted telephone interviews. Sample sizes for the years 2007, 2009, and 2011 were 10,000 
with only landline telephone numbers. The latest BZgA study in 2013 used a dual-frame approach, in which 
10,001 landline telephone numbers and 1,500 mobile phone numbers were included in the analysis. To 
ensure comparability between the studies, we considered only the results of the sample with landline 
telephone numbers. Response rates for the BZgA studies were 63.3% in 2007, 61.6% in 2009, 59.9% in 
2011, and 56.8% in 2013. Gambling participation rates in the 12 months preceding the BZgA surveys 
decreased significantly over time, from 55.0% in 2007 to 53.8% in 2009 to 50.7% in 2011 to 44.9% in 2013. 
The decline in participation rates could be observed for both genders and across all age groups. The 12-
month prevalence of the most popular gambling activity, “lotto 6 out of 49,” decreased significantly from 
35.5% in 2007 to 28.7% in 2013. In contrast, the 12-month prevalence of gambling on EGMs has increased 
steadily from 2.2% in 2007 to 2.7% in 2009 to 2.9% in 2011 to 3.0% in 2013. The greatest increases were 
evident among young males. For example, the 12-month prevalence of EGM gambling increased for 18-to 
20-year-old males from 5.8% in 2007 to 19.3% in 2013 and for 21-to 25-year-old males from 5.1% in 2007 
to 14.4% in 2013. 
For 2009, 2011, and 2013, the BZgA surveys assessed the severity of gambling problems with the South 
Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieur & Blume, 1987). The 12-month prevalence of pathological gambling 
decreased from 0.45% in 2009 and 0.49% in 2011 to 0.38% in 2013. The 12-month prevalence of 
problematical gambling decreased from 0.64% in 2009 to 0.51% in 2011 to 0.45% in 2013. In describing 
the socioeconomic profiles of problematic and pathological gamblers, a multivariable analysis showed that 
male gender, immigration background, and being unemployed were significant predictor variables at the 
5% significance level. 
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The German literature has primarily focused on prevalence studies to delineate the distribution of 
gambling across population segments. However, the population is not the only relevant focal point in an 
epidemiological study. For a complete epidemiological description of gambling, we need to include spatial 
or temporal dimensions in our analysis (Suzuki, 2012). Our analysis focuses on the viewpoint of place-
based health research, which perceives gambling as a complex phenomenon with interconnected 
relationships between gambling activities and the social environment, consisting of not only the gambling 
venues, but also the socioeconomic, cultural, and political contexts (Korn & Shaffer, 1999).  
Contextual factors that characterize the social and physical environment of gamblers play an increasingly 
important role in the study of gambling by demonstrating how the local context of the neighborhood 
influences the gambling behavior of individuals (Marshall, 2009). One possible contextual effect that helps 
explain the development and maintenance of gambling disorders concerns the availability and accessibility 
of EGMs. Various authors have shown that employees of casino and gaming venues exhibit higher rates of 
gambling disorders than the general population does, providing evidence that increased exposure to 
gambling at an individual level is associated with gambling-related harm (Hing & Gainsbury, 2011; Shaffer 
& Hall, 2002; Shaffer, Vander Bilt, & Hall, 1999; Wu & Wong, 2008). Analyzing gambling at an area level, 
Marshall (2005) noted that gambling providers could induce demand for gambling by placing EGMs at 
favorable geographical locations. Increased gambling prevalence rates and higher gambling expenditures 
would then be supply-driven, or at least demand for gambling would be encouraged by the supply side. 
The location and number of EGMs are situational determinants of gambling and may explain why some 
people start gambling and why certain socioeconomic classes are particularly vulnerable to specific forms 
of gambling (Griffiths, 1999).  
The proposition that the supply side encourages or induces gambling activity remains controversial. For 
example, Govoni, Frisch, Rupcich, and Getty (1998) found no difference in the prevalence rates of 
pathological and problem gambling or the per capita gambling expenditure after a new casino opened, 
whereas Ladouceur, Jacques, Ferland, and Giroux (1999) established an association between increased 
opportunities for gambling and the prevalence of pathological gambling. Other studies have established 
significant associations between gambling problems and residential proximity to casinos (Welte, Barnes, 
Wieczorek, Tidwell, & Hoffman, 2007; Welte, Wieczorek, Barnes, Tidwell, & Hoffman, 2004), as well as 
between gambling prevalence and per capita density of EGMs (Storer, Abbott, & Stubbs, 2009). Vasiliadis, 
Jackson, Christensen, and Francis (2013) reviewed the existing empirical literature on the interrelation 
between physical accessibility and gambling involvement in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and 
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the United States and reiterated the substantiated evidence of a positive relationship between higher EGM 
density and higher gambling participation and expenditure.  
In addition to the inclusion of contextual effects, gambling behavior at an area-unit level can be described 
by compositional factors such as socioeconomic characteristics or lifestyle-related variables of the local 
population (Welte, Wieczorek, Barnes, & Tidwell, 2006). For instance, various international studies have 
shown that EGM density is higher in socioeconomically deprived areas (Pearce, Mason, Hiscock, & Day, 
2008; Wardle, Keily, Astbury, & Reith, 2014; Wheeler, Rigby, & Huriwai, 2006). Socioeconomic 
characteristics of the area, such as the unemployment rate, may also be considered risk factors. These 
variables predict or are closely associated with the development and maintenance of gambling disorders, 
and there are many ways to select variables in order to measure relative deprivation. For example, to 
assess ecological associations between small-area population characteristics and the location of gaming 
machines, Wheeler et al. (2006) used New Zealand’s Deprivation Index, which is composed of census-
based measures of income, unemployment, amenity access, and education. In addition to socioeconomic 
risk factors, we can also include other risk factors in our analysis, such as genetic vulnerabilities (Lobo & 
Kennedy, 2009), neurobiological factors (Iancu, Lowengrub, Dembinsky, Kotler, & Dannon, 2008), and 
personality traits and disorders (MacLaren, Fugelsang, Harrigan, & Dixon, 2011), as well as mental and 
substance use disorders (Dowling et al., 2015). Not all of the above-mentioned factors are available at the 
aggregate level. Hence, our analysis focused on socioeconomic factors, where group-level data were 
collected and made available by the Federal Statistics Office of Germany and the Statistical Offices of the 
federal states. To the best of our knowledge, no German study has examined the spatial variation of EGMs. 
Therefore, we set out to analyze the statistical associations between EGM densities and socioeconomic 
characteristics in small-area units. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Regional Data for the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg 
For our analysis, we focused on the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW), one of 16 federal states in 
Germany. The state of BW lies in southwestern Germany and is bordered by the states of Rhineland-
Palatine to the northwest, Hessen to the north, and Bavaria to the east; it shares borders with two 
countries, France to the west and Switzerland to the south (see Figure 2.1). BW is the third largest of the 
federal states, with an area of 35,751 square kilometers and a population of approximately 10.8 million 
people.  
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Figure 2.1: The Federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, one of 16 Federal states in Germany 
Because our ecological study design used aggregate-level data, as our unit of spatial analysis, we chose 
local communities (Gemeinden), which correspond to the lowest administrative tier in BW. In total, there 
are 1,101 local communities in BW, but we considered only communities with populations over 10,000, 
leaving us with 244 local communities for our analysis. Our 244 communities comprised approximately 7.3 
million inhabitants, which amounts to approximately 68% of the total population of BW. The data 
originated from three sources. The first data set concerned the EGM locations in BW and was compiled by 
Trümper and Heimann (2012), who restricted their analysis to communities with a population of at least 
10,000. For each of these 244 communities, they gathered information regarding the granted gambling 
concessions and the number of gambling establishments and EGMs from the respective public order 
offices (Ordnungsamt; effective date: January 1, 2012). A total of approximately 31,000 EGMs were 
included in our analysis. The community data sets for our socioeconomic variables originated from the 
publicly available 2011 European Union Census and from data files for 2012 that were made available to 
us by the Statistical Office of BW upon our request. 
 
2.2.2 Socioeconomic Risk Factors for Germany 
We used the PAGE study to derive valid socioeconomic risk factors for our regression models (Meyer et 
al., 2011). With 15,023 participants, the PAGE study included the largest community-based sample in 
Germany. It used computer-assisted telephone interviews with a stratified and clustered sampling design 
conducted from January 2010 to March 2011, and it included individuals between 14 and 64 years of age. 
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Of the interviews with the 15,023 participants, 14,022 were based on landline telephone numbers and 
1,001 were based on mobile phone numbers, with the aim of including disadvantaged populations that 
did not have landline telephones. For the landline telephone survey, the response rate was calculated at 
44.5% and the cooperation rate at 54.6%. For the mobile phone survey, the response rate stood at 36.8% 
and the cooperation rate at 57.3%. Using the guidelines of the American Psychiatric Association, the PAGE 
study categorized gambling severity according to the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The researchers 
categorized the severity of gambling problems into two subthreshold categories of gambling problems: 
one with one or two symptoms and one with three or four symptoms from the DSM-IV. Pathological 
gambling was defined by the presence of five to 10 symptoms from the DSM-IV criteria. In total, the 12-
month prevalence rates for pathological gambling stood at 0.3% in comparison to subthreshold gambling 
problems with one or two criteria at 1.4% and three to four criteria at 0.3% (Meyer et al., 2011). As 
expected, the lifetime prevalence rates were substantially higher, standing at 1.0% for pathological 
gambling, 5.5% for subthreshold gambling with one to two criteria, and 1.4% for subthreshold gambling 
with three to four criteria. Meyer et al. (2011) used a multinomial logistic regression to quantify the relative 
risk for pathological gambling in relation to given sociodemographic risk factors; Table 2.1 summarizes 
their results with respect to the diagnosis of lifetime pathological gambling. For the PAGE study, table 2.1 
shows that the odds ratios associated with younger age, male gender, less school education, migration 
background, and unemployment status are statistically significant at the 5% level (p < .05). 
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Table 2.1: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Lifetime Diagnosis of Pathological Gambling on 
Socioeconomic Risk Factors 
Socioeconomic risk factor OR 95% CI 
Age 0.96 [0.95, 0.98] 
Gender   
Male 
Female 
10.71 
Reference value 
[5.42, 21.17] 
 
School education 
<10 years education 
10 years education 
>10 years education 
 
2.43 
1.97 
Reference value 
 
[1.46, 4.05] 
[1.21, 3.20] 
Marital status 
Married 
      Unmarried/divorced 
 
1.06 
Reference value 
 
[0.52, 2.14] 
Migration background 
Yes 
No 
 
2.32 
Reference value 
 
[1.39, 3.86] 
 
Unemployment status 
Yes 
No 
 
3.26 
Reference value 
 
[1.74, 6.08] 
Note. The lifetime diagnosis of pathological gambling was the dependent variable in 
this model, with 1 = lifetime diagnosis and 0 = no lifetime diagnosis. OR = odds 
ratio; CI = confidence interval. Adapted from Meyer et al. (2011). 
 
Consistency of the socioeconomic risk factors. Socioeconomic risk factors may vary according to the types 
of gambling, implying that not all forms of gambling are homogeneous (Moragas et al., 2015). We needed 
to make sure that the socioeconomic risk factors from the PAGE study accurately described the profile of 
EGM players. In the PAGE study, the participants were interviewed about different forms of gambling such 
as poker, lotteries, sports and horse betting, and illegal gambling. Meyer et al. (2011) used refined models 
and analyses to determine which gambling type was associated most significantly with gambling disorders. 
First, in a multivariate logistic regression for the diagnosis of lifetime pathological gambling, the 
participants who self-reported more than 10 days of gambling activity demonstrated that gambling on 
EGMs was the most significant variable associated with pathological gambling, exhibiting the highest odds 
ratio (odds ratio = 6.3, 95% confidence interval [CI] [4.1 , 9.8], p < .01), followed by poker (odds ratio = 5.0, 
95% CI [2.8 , 8.9], p < .01). Second, pathological gamblers were asked to self-report which of the gambling 
forms had the strongest impact in developing their gambling problems. A total of 108 of 116 pathological 
gamblers offered an answer, with the majority (n = 54 pathological gamblers) designating EGMs as the 
most significant contributor in developing gambling problems, followed by poker in second place (n = 16 
pathological gamblers).  
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2.2.3 Ecological Analysis 
Selecting variables from the PAGE study and using them in an ecological analysis makes sense because a 
community-based analysis offers a good starting point to assess the significance of risk factors at the 
ecological level. In contrast, the indiscriminate choice of explanatory variables may lead to spurious 
correlations and unfounded statistical associations at the ecological level.  
We needed to translate the variables from table 2.1 into operable aggregate-level variables. For our model, 
we defined younger age as the share of 15- to 29-year-olds in each community population. “Male gender” 
referred to the share of males in each community, and the share of migrants and unemployed individuals 
in the communities represented the risk factors “migration background” and “unemployment status” from 
the PAGE study. “School education” was captured by the share of high school graduates in the community, 
with high school graduation referring to finishing the 12 to 13 required years of secondary education in 
Germany (Abitur). At the individual level, marital status was not a predictor for a lifetime diagnosis of 
pathological gambling in the PAGE study (p = .87, cf. table 2.1). Nevertheless, we used the share of married 
persons in our ecological study to assess whether this variable was associated with EGM density at an 
aggregate level. All of our socioeconomic risk factors were expressed per 1,000 individuals to remove 
variations arising from differences in population size across communities. Table 2.2 summarizes 
information regarding the variables that we used in our ecological analysis. 
Table 2.2: Variable description 
Dependent variable  
EGM density Number of EGMs per 1,000 population for each community 
Independent variables  
Younger age Number of 15- to 29-year-olds per 1,000 population for each community 
Male gender Number of males per 1,000 population for each community 
High school graduation Number of high school graduates (Abitur) per 1,000 population for each 
community 
Marital status Number of married persons per 1,000 population for each community 
Migration background Number of persons with migration background per 1,000 population for 
each community 
Unemployment status Number of unemployed persons per 1,000 population for each community 
Note. EGM = electronic gambling machine.   
For the 244 communities in BW, Table 2.3 displays the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
of our variables. 
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Table 2.3: Description of the data set 
Socioeconomic risk factor M SD Minimum Maximum 
EGM density 4.0 2.6 0.2 16.0 
Younger age 172.1 17.3 137.0 301.0 
Male gender 490.6 7.4 463.4 510.0 
High school graduation 160.9 59.0 68.1 515.0 
Marital status 479.1 26.0 347.0 527.6 
Migration background 98.3 33.3 31.6 209.0 
Unemployment status 20.4 5.1 8.5 40.9 
Note. EGM = electronic gambling machine.  
 
2.2.4 Statistical Methods 
To analyze our data, we used the ordinary least squares method in a multivariate linear regression model. 
Because all of our data were continuous, we assessed the statistical significance using Student’s two-tailed 
t test, with the significance level set to .05. We did not adjust alpha levels to compensate for the familywise 
error rate, as this would have compromised the statistical power of our analysis. Effect sizes were 
quantified by the unstandardized coefficients of the regression model, as well as by the unadjusted and 
adjusted coefficients of determination. We confirmed the validity of the regression model, but those 
results are not shown here; that is, we tested for the absence of heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity, 
the independence and normality of the error terms, and the proper model specification. The statistical 
program STATA 13 was used for the analyses. 
2.3 Results 
A multiple regression analysis for 244 communities in BW was conducted to evaluate the relationship 
between EGM density and the socioeconomic risk factors of younger age, male gender, high school 
graduation, marital status, migration background, and unemployment status. The regression equation was 
found to be statistically significant, R2 = .29, adjusted R2 = .27, F(6, 237) = 15.8, p < .001. The results of the 
regression model are depicted in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Linear regression of EGM density on socioeconomic risk factors for 244 communities in Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
Socioeconomic risk factor b 95% CI SE p 
Younger age 0.003 [-0.022, 0.029] 0.013 .806 
Male gender -0.027 [-0.072, 0.017] 0.023 .226 
High school graduation -0.014 [-0.021, -0.008] 0.003 < .001 
Marital status -0.013 [-0.032, 0.007] 0.010 .203 
Migration background 0.020 [0.011, 0.030] 0.005 < .001 
Unemployment status 0.140 [0.076, 0.205] 0.033 < .001 
Note. EGM = electronic gambling machine; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; CI = confidence interval.  
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Of six socioeconomic risk factors, only three were statistically significant at the 5% level. Ceteris paribus, 
communities with larger shares of unemployed individuals or migrants were significantly associated with 
higher EGM densities (p < .001), whereas the share of high school graduates in communities was negatively 
associated with EGM densities (p < .001). The remaining three socioeconomic risk factors—i.e., the share 
of males, married, and younger people in the communities—failed to reach statistical significance.  
As every socioeconomic risk factor was measured in the same units, we were able to compare the 
unstandardized regression coefficients for each factor. The variable of unemployment status, as indexed 
by its unstandardized coefficient of 0.140, was shown to have the strongest relationship to EGM density. 
This indicated that for every additional unemployed person per 1,000 individuals, there was a predicted 
increase in the quantity of EGMs by 0.140 per 1,000 individuals. In comparison, the unstandardized 
coefficients of the statistically significant variables of migration background (b = 0.020, p < .001) and high 
school education (b = -0.014, p < .001) were considerably smaller.  
The CIs in Table 2.4 provided a range of plausible values for the regression parameters. The 95% CI suggests 
that if we were to repeat the analysis over and over, the CI would contain the true parameter 95% of the 
time. The 95% CI for unemployment status was [0.076, 0.205], suggesting that the quantity of EGMs in the 
communities was raised by at least 0.076, and perhaps by as much as 0.205 per 1,000 individuals. For the 
statistically significant variables of migration background and high school education, and the 
nonsignificant variables of younger age, male gender, and marital status, the smallest lower limit of the 
CIs stood at -0.072 and the highest upper limit at 0.030. The highest upper limit of 0.030 belonged to the 
variable of migration background. It was considerably smaller than the upper limit of the unemployment 
status and hence practically nonsignificant. The smallest lower limit of -0.072 for the variable of male 
gender might have been of practical significance, yet the CI contained the value of 0, nullifying the 
statistical and practical significance of the effect size. Thus, unemployment status was a statistically and 
practically significant variable in our analysis, whereas the remaining socioeconomic risk factors failed to 
reach practical significance, statistical significance, or both. 
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Table 2.5 illustrates paradigmatically the communities with the five top and bottom numbers of EMGs per 
1,000 population, alongside the share of unemployed people. 
Table 2.5: Communities with top and bottom five EGM densities, alongside unemployment statistics 
Community EGMs per 1,000 population Unemployed per 1,000 
population 
 
Top Five     
Kehl 16.0 26.3  
Oehringen 15.4 22.8  
Riedlingen 13.7 25.0  
Geislingen 11.9 27.7  
Waldshut-Tiengen 10.1 23.3  
    
Bottom Five     
Leingarten 0.4 15.6  
Heddesheim 0.3 20.0  
Gundelfingen 0.3 18.2  
Kraichtal 0.3 15.5  
Ubstadt-Weiher 0.2 13.6  
Note. EGM = electronic gambling machine. 
 
The descriptive statistics confirm the regression results. The communities with the top five EGM densities 
consistently had greater unemployment shares than did the communities with the bottom five EGM 
densities. 
2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Practical Conclusions 
Starting from an evaluation of socioeconomic risk factors in the PAGE study, we used those individually 
based variables at the group level and assessed their usefulness in an exploratory analysis. For the first 
time in Germany, we used an ecological study design to investigate the associations between EGM density 
and socioeconomic deprivation at the community level.  
Our analysis demonstrates a statistically significant association between EGM density and the three 
socioeconomic risk factors of unemployment status, migration background, and high school graduation. 
Judging from the effect size indices, only unemployment status is also of practical interest. With an average 
density of four EGMs per 1,000 individuals in the 244 communities of BW (cf. Table 2.3), the increase in 
the quantity of EGMs per additional unemployed individual (b = 0.140) is of considerable practical 
significance. The importance of unemployment status at the aggregate level is in line with findings from 
other ecological correlation studies (Pearce et al., 2008; Wardle et al., 2014; Wheeler et al., 2006). The 
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results of our study provide preliminary indications that gambling providers place EGMs at geographical 
locations with relatively high unemployment rates. Further research should investigate whether this 
relationship also holds true for other geographical areas in Germany. 
We cannot establish statistically or practically significant ecological correlations between EGM density and 
the share of married, male, or younger people. This is in contrast to other community-based 
epidemiological studies that have consistently associated gambling disorders at the individual level with 
younger age and male gender (e.g., Blanco, Hasin, Petry, Stinson, & Grant, 2006; Kessler et al., 2008). 
However, these individually based risk factors do not necessarily hold at an ecological level. The atomistic 
fallacy in epidemiological research describes situations in which associations between variables at the 
individual level may differ from associations between variables measured at the ecological level (Diez 
Roux, 2002). Therefore, in some cases, we may not be able to predict the behavior of groups from the 
behavior of individuals.  
One possible solution is to reexamine statistical associations at a finer scale of ecological analysis. In future 
studies, we can investigate whether statistical associations exist at the city level, similar to the study of 
Gilliland and Ross (2005), which assessed the spatial distribution of EGMs and the socioeconomic 
conditions for the municipalities of Montreal and Laval. For example, Stuttgart, the state capital of BW, 
would provide an ideal field for carrying out an ecological gambling study. If the socioeconomic risk factors 
of male gender, marital status, and younger age remain nonsignificant at the city level, we can approve 
their nonsignificance at the ecological level with greater confidence. 
Our analysis is only a starting point for investigating the complex set of interactions between 
socioeconomic area characteristics and EGM density. Caution is advised when moving from statistical 
associations at an ecological level to causal interpretations and relationships. In order to strengthen the 
evidence base for a relationship between socioeconomic deprivation and environmental exposure to 
EGMs, further longitudinal or repeated cross-sectional studies need to assess how changes in the 
socioeconomic environment affect the distribution of EGMs. An extension of our ecological model includes 
time as an important constituent of a time-geographical model. Spatial interdependencies likely vary over 
space and time, and it is important to identify the most crucial places and environmental contexts over 
different times to help estimate gambling exposure most effectively (Cummins, 2007).  
Studies that examine how participation rates and gambling problems evolve over time provide another 
valuable research direction. International studies showed that an expansion of EGMs and increased 
exposure to gambling lead to rapid increases in gambling participation and problem gambling at first, 
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followed by an adaptation period with gradual reductions in gambling participation and problem gambling 
rates (LaPlante & Shaffer, 2007; Shaffer, Labrie, & LaPlante, 2004; Storer et al., 2009). Factors that scholars 
believe influence the gradual adaptation of society to gambling include increased public awareness of 
problem gambling, informal social controls, expansion of treatment and self-help organizations, and 
regulatory and public health measures (Abbott, Stone, Billi, & Yeung, 2015). In a meta-analysis of 34 
surveys in Australia and New Zealand, Storer et al. (2009) demonstrated that increased problem gambling 
prevalence rates are linked to higher EGM density. However, in a multivariable regression analysis, they 
also showed how problem gambling prevalence decreased over time at a rate of 0.09% per annum. In a 
meta-analysis of 202 studies from 1975 to 2012, Williams, Volberg, and Stevens (2012) affirmed the 
decrease in gambling participation and problem gambling rates. The downward trend began in the late 
1990s in North America and in the early 2000s in Australia and Europe.  
The authors of two recent studies in Sweden and Australia only partially affirmed the adaptation 
hypothesis. In comparing the results of the Swedish Gambling Study in 1997–1998 and the Swedish 
Longitudinal Gambling Study in 2008–2009, Abbott, Romild, and Volberg (2014) showed that past-year 
gambling participation declined from 88.0% to 71.6%, whereas past-30 days participation in EGMs 
increased from 3.0% to 4.0%. The authors found, contrary to the prediction of the adaptation hypothesis, 
a statistically significant increase in the prevalence of lifetime probable pathological gambling from 1997–
1998 to 2008–2009, with no significant changes in the prevalence of lifetime problem gambling and of 12-
month probable pathological or problem gambling. 
For Australia, Abbott et al. (2015) compared the results of the 2003 Victorian Longitudinal Community 
Attitudes Survey and the 2008 Victorian Gambling Study and found significant reductions in gambling 
participation rates for the previous 12 months, as well as for the monthly and weekly participation 
frequencies. Gambling participation on EGMs for the previous 12 months decreased from 33.4% in 2003 
to 21.5% in 2008, affirming the adaptation hypothesis. Here again, in contrast to the predictions of the 
adaptation hypothesis, there is no evidence of prevalence rate reductions in problem and moderate-risk 
gambling. 
For Germany, the BZgA studies offer insight into the processes of exposure and adaptation (BZgA, 2014). 
The repeated cross-sectional analyses allow us to monitor patterns of change over time. Gambling 
participation rates in the 12 months preceding the surveys decreased from 55.0% in 2007 to 44.9% in 2013, 
affirming the adaptation hypothesis. Contrary to the general trend of decreasing participation rates in 
nearly all gambling activities, the 12-month prevalence of EGM gambling steadily increased from 2.2% in 
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2007 to 3.0% in 2013. The increases in 12-month prevalence rates of EGM gambling were most evident in 
18- to 20-year-old males and 21- to 25-year old males. In the first group, the prevalence rate increased 
fourfold from 5.8% in 2007 to 23.5% in 2013, and in the second group, it more than doubled from 5.1% in 
2007 to 12.8% in 2013. It is interesting to note that the prevalence rate for the male age group of 26- to 
35-year-olds increased only slightly from 5.8% in 2007 to 7.7% in 2013. How differential exposures and 
vulnerabilities to EGMs lead to gender and age disparities merits a systematic analysis. Does increased 
EGM availability explain the rise in prevalence rates among males aged 18 to 20 and 21 to 25 years? Is the 
male age group of 26- to 35-year-olds not vulnerable to increased EGM exposure, or has the process of 
adaptation decreased prevalence rates? It is also possible that the lower prevalence rate for the 26- to 35-
year-old males is biased downward because the age bracket covers a 10-year range, whereas the 18- to 
20-year bracket covers only a 3-year range and the 21- to 25-year bracket covers only a 5-year range. In 
epidemiological terms, we need to exhibit the changes in prevalence rates over time by age-period-cohort 
modeling strategies. In decomposing age, period, and cohort effects, we might be able to determine why 
certain age groups are more susceptible to increased EGM availability and which age groups are less 
affected or more able to adapt to the negative effects of gambling by an accumulation of exposure 
experience. 
As far as problematic and pathological gambling behavior is concerned, the adaptation hypothesis seems 
not to hold from a viewpoint of statistical significance, although a trend is observed toward lower rates. 
The 12-month prevalence of pathological gambling in the BZgA studies decreased from 0.45% in 2009 and 
0.49% in 2011 to 0.38% in 2013. The 12-month prevalence of problematical gambling decreased from 
0.64% in 2009 to 0.51% in 2011 to 0.45% in 2013. The decreases in the proportion of problem and 
pathological gamblers in both male and female respondents were statistically nonsignificant at the 5% 
level.  
With the 2012 Interstate Treaty on Gambling, legislators plan to implement harm minimization policies 
based on geographical criteria. The minimum distance regulation in BW obliges gaming halls to keep a 
straight-line minimum distance of 500 m from each other, as well as from child and youth facilities. These 
provisions will come into effect after a transitional period that ends in July 2017, with some experts 
expecting a 55% reduction in the number of EGMs and a 68% reduction in the number of gaming halls 
(Becker & Heinze, 2015; Vieweg, 2013). Area-based policies and locally targeted interventions offer 
promising possibilities to combat gambling problems; on the basis of our results, public authorities should 
focus on decreasing EGM density in communities with relatively high unemployment rates.  
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To support our policy recommendation, we refer to a principle that originated from German national 
environmental law during the 1970s (Myers, 2002): The “principle of precaution,” translated from the 
German word Vorsorgeprinzip, found its way into international law in the fields of environmental policy, 
natural resource management, and biodiversity conservation and more recently emerged as a principle of 
international law in international treaties and national policy statements (Andorno, 2004). The 
precautionary principle calls for preventive measures in public health affairs whenever potential harm to 
human health or the environment may be anticipated. This principle of practical decision making provides 
policymakers with the guidance to forestall potential adverse effects in the face of uncertainty of impact 
and causality.  
We have reasonable grounds for concern that increased availability of EGMs raises the threat of gambling-
related harm to human health. With the precautionary principle, we err on the side of caution, shifting the 
burden of proof about absence of harm from the public to the gambling industry. Policy makers should 
not wait until evidence of gambling-related harm from increased EGM availability is established beyond 
all reasonable doubt before taking preventive measures. Instead, they are permitted to act on the basis of 
evidence that is not conclusive. 
2.4.2 Directions for Future Research 
Future research should focus on two extensions to our model: multilevel and spatial regression models 
(Anselin, 1988; Diez Roux, 2002). Multilevel methods consider the concomitant inclusion and analysis of 
individual and ecological variables within a single model. In a multilevel analysis of gambling, the effect 
and influences of the neighborhood are a separate contextual level that acts on the individual gambling 
activity among the local population. For instance, living in a privileged socioeconomic environment might 
offer a protective effect with regard to at-risk gambling because migrant populations are less likely to 
reside in these neighborhoods and therefore the local population is less likely to adopt the behaviors of 
these vulnerable populations. In addition to capturing the simultaneous effects of individual and group-
level variables on individual-level outcomes, multilevel models can incorporate interactions across levels. 
For example, the interaction between EGM density and socioeconomic risk factors can be reciprocal in 
nature: Neighborhoods with a high density of EGMs might be unattractive to populations of higher 
socioeconomic status, and when those populations avoid living in those neighborhoods, rental costs and 
property prices can decrease, which in turn attracts individuals with low socioeconomic status. By focusing 
on the nested structure of the data, multilevel analysis helps explain the ways that higher level 
environments affect the decisions of individuals.  
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Whereas multilevel models consider only the correlation within neighborhoods, spatial regression models 
focus on the inter-neighborhood correlation structure. We expect an interaction between neighboring 
units that depends on geographical distance or shared borders. Future research should focus on the use 
of regression models with spatially varying parameters to capture the local variations over different 
geographical areas and to improve the understanding of local relationships and spatial variations in 
gambling behavior. 
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ABSTRACT  
There are sizeable differences in the Electronic Gambling Machine (EGM) supply among German regions. 
Furthermore, the EGM supply concentrates in certain regions which results in gambling hot spots. 
Interestingly the spatial clustering of EGM supply is still observed when we control for agglomeration 
effects caused by population. This leads to the question why the EGM supply concentrates in some regions 
and remains low in others. We argue that the concentration of supply can be mostly explained by the 
socioeconomic characteristics of these regions. This paper makes three central contributions to the 
location based gambling research. First, it visualizes the absolute and relative supply of EGMs in German 
communities and highlights the spatial clustering of high and low EGM density regions. Second, it 
implements socioeconomic and geographical control variables for a more distinct description of regional 
differences. Third, it employs spatial econometric modelling to quantify and explain the occurrence of 
EGM hot spots. For our analysis we use census and EGM market data. The main finding implies, that there 
is a clear clustering of the EGM supply across regions at first, but when considering the socioeconomic 
characteristics / deprivation of the regions, most of the clustering effect is erased. The model explains 
most of the clustering effect which appears to exist only when there is no slender consideration of the 
socioeconomic differences across regions. This result supports the hypothesis that high gambling activity 
in one region does not affect the gambling activity in neighbouring regions.  
                                                          
4 This article has been originally published as: Jasny, J. (2016). „Is Gambling Contagious? An Analysis of Electronic 
Gambling Machine Clustering in Germany“. The Journal of Gambling Business and Economics, 10 (3): 54-70. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Pathological and problem gambling can have severe medical, psychological, and social ramifications for 
susceptible individuals (Fong, 2005). From an aggregated view, the prevalence rates for pathological 
gambling in Germany range from 0.2 to 0.6 % (Sassen et al. 2011, BZgA 2014, Meyer et al. 2011). In this 
regard, Germany exhibits the lowest proportion of past-year problem and pathological gambling among 
general population samples in Europe (Kun et al. 2012). At the same time, Germany was facing a 
continuous growth trend in gambling activity during the last decade. For example, the number of 
electronic gambling machines (EGMs) has increased from 200.000 in 2007 to 263.000 in 2013 (Vieweg, 
2014). The Federal Gambling Authority of Germany estimates that revenues of 5.3 billion dollar were 
generated solely by EGMs in 2014 (FGA, 2015). This amounts to approximately half of the total gambling 
revenues making EGM gambling the largest gambling branch in Germany. 
Besides their placement in casinos, EGMs can be found in gambling arcades, pubs, and bars which makes 
them widely and easily accessible for the public. The regulation of these EGM venues is implemented in 
the federal laws of the German Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung) and the German Gambling Ordinance 
(Spielverordnung). Even though gambling legislation has curtailed gambling activity in certain aspects, such 
as the improved protection of minors, it has also liberalized game characteristics and improved the 
framework conditions of gambling operators considerably. With the liberalizations in the EGM sector, 
turnover increased by 42% from 2005 to 2009 (Meyer, 2011). In light of increasing concerns over the 
development of gambling disorders and to limit the provision of gambling services, the legislators have 
overhauled the Interstate Treaty on Gambling in 2012 (Glücksspieländerungsstaatsvertrag). The Interstate 
Treaty is transformed into federal state gambling acts for each of Germanys 16 federal states. One major 
aspect of the casino acts is the requirement for minimum distances between existing gaming venues, and 
between gaming venues and youth facilities. For example in the German state of Baden-Württemberg 
gambling arcade providers have to maintain a minimum distance of 500 meters to other arcade providers 
and vice versa starting 2017. They also have to sustain a minimal distance of at least 500 meters to youth 
facilities such as kindergarten. The rationale of imposing minimum distances is included in the Interstate 
Treaty: Gamblers that are leaving their gambling spot should not be tempted to re-enter another gambling 
venue immediately after finishing their current game. Simply put the gambler should “cool down” from 
excessive gambling activity and not being tempted into the next arcade.  
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From an aggregated perspective a vast literature examines the interrelation between availability and 
accessibility of EGMs and gambling prevalence, expenditure and gambling related problems. In a meta-
analysis of 34 studies in Australia and New Zealand, Storer et al. (2009) affirm the positive relationship 
between higher EGM density and problem gambling prevalence rates. A systematic review conducted by 
Vasiliadis et al. (2013) reiterates the positive relationship between EGM density, EGM proximity and 
increased gambling involvement. Ceteris paribus it can be expected that high gambling presence in one 
region could affect the gambling activity of another region and vice versa. However, there are other studies 
that disprove these views: For South Australia, Delfabbro (2008) found that the removal of a modest 
amount of EGMs does not affect EGM expenditure or gambling behavior. Nonetheless the majority of 
literature proposes an association between exposure to gambling opportunities and gambling 
involvement. However none of the studies analyzed whether gambling activity in one region affects the 
gambling activity of neighboring regions and vice versa. This relationship can be a possible explanation, 
why some regions and their neighbors face high gambling activity and others low gambling activity. 
Unfortunately, little research focuses on the interrelation between EGM gambling demand and EGM 
gambling supply which makes it difficult to tackle the causality question. Whether the demand for 
gambling induces the supply of EGMs or the presence of EGMs tempts players to play more has not been 
tackled in the literature on an aggregated level. Following the logic of German legislation, implies that a 
problematic gambler is tempted by proximate EGM arcades, which in conclusion results in a higher 
demand for EGMs. Hence the initial impulse which induces the demand is the availability of EGM venues. 
Since German gambling arcades are limited to a maximum number of 12 EGMs per gambling arcade 
concession and pubs can setup a maximum of three EGMs, we can assume that the rising demand leads 
to increasing numbers of EGM venues in the neighborhood. In other words, there could be clustering of 
gambling activity in proximate areas where the demand for gambling is high.  
One major reason for varying EGM supply are regional socioeconomic differences. This topic was 
addressed by several authors in different research setups. Marshall (2005) argues that gambling providers 
could induce demand by placing EGMs in favorable regions. Furthermore, Marshall (2009) highlighted the 
importance of the local environment as a driving factor for the gambling intensity. He stresses to 
distinguish between compositional and contextual factors which can affect gambling intensity. Welte et 
al. (2006) and Pearce et al. (2008) used national survey data and census data to study the relationship 
between local area disadvantages and gambling involvement. Both studies confirm that the odds for 
gambling involvement are higher when regions face higher unemployment and lower income. Several 
papers study the relationship between EGM density and socioeconomic deprivation. Wheeler et al. (2006) 
38 
 
find a significant positive correlation between EGM density and socioeconomically deprived regions in 
New Zealand. Wardle et al. (2014) confirm this finding for Great-Britain. Furthermore, some studies 
identify individual-level risk factors such as family status, younger age and lower education which can also 
affect gambling intensity. Johansson et al. (2009) provide a broad overview of gambling related risk factors. 
Our aim is to study the spatial clustering of EGM supply in Germany’s most populated state, North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW). More precisely we want to test the hypothesis, whether the EGM supply of neighboring 
regions is self-reinforcing which we interpret as a contagion effect. We focus on the contagion analysis 
while we control for socioeconomic differences across regions. Using Germany as a sample has two major 
advantages compared to countries with larger areas like the US or Australia. First, it has many densely 
populated communities with detailed socioeconomic data and second, those communities are in close 
proximity to each other which makes them a natural choice for this kind of analysis. The motivation for 
our research objective is illustrated in figure 3.1. The left side shows the number of EGM per community 
in Germany’s largest federal state NRW. We observe that regions with high EGM numbers are clustered in 
nearby areas, especially those areas neighboring large cities like Cologne, Dortmund, Düsseldorf and 
Essen. One of the main reasons for this congestion is the population effect, i.e. regions with a higher 
population have higher numbers of EGMs. We controlled for this effect by computing the EGM density 
(number of EGMs per thousand residents) for each community on the right side of the figure. The 
clustering structure of EGM supply in the right figure is still present but less severe.  
 
Figure 3.1: The number of EGMs by region (left) and the number of EGMs per 1000 residents  
by region (right). 
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The structure of the paper is the following. Part two will present the methodology, define neighborhood 
in terms of spatial econometrics and introduce tools to analyze the spatial interrelation among neighboring 
regions. Part three gives an overview of the data. Part four contains the major results. Part five has some 
concluding remarks and suggestions for further research. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
The spatial concentration of EGM supply can be best described by the first law of geography which states 
that near things are stronger related than distant things (Tobler, 1970). Spatial statistics and spatial 
econometrics provide techniques which help to visualize data and detect pattern of similarity or 
dissimilarity such as clustering or hot spots for geographical observations like communities or states. One 
measure to illustrate the similarity among observed values is the spatial autocorrelation. It describes 
whether observed values in one region are similar or dissimilar to the values of neighboring regions. When 
the autocorrelation is positive there is spatial clustering of the observed values among different locations, 
if the autocorrelation is negative we have no clustering but rather diffused values. Spatial autocorrelation 
can be tested by Moran’s I test statistics which helps to assess spatial similarity or dissimilarity of the 
gambling supply. To calculate Moran’s I statistics it is necessary to define more precisely what is meant by 
neighborhood.  
 
3.2.1 Measuring Geographical Proximity 
The suggested tool to describe proximity or neighborhood is the spatial weight matrix (Drukker et al. 
2013a). The spatial weight matrix formalizes which geographical unit is the neighbor of another 
geographical unit, this can be done in different ways. Assume we wanted to define the nearest neighbors 
of a single entity in space like a house, whose position can be expressed by one longitude and one latitude 
coordinate. The neighborhood of this particular house could be defined by its k-nearest neighbors, e.g. the 
six closest houses. Alternatively we can use an arbitrary Euclidian distance radius around that house (e.g. 
500 meters) where all other houses within that radius can be considered neighbors. Since our data consists 
of administrative areas it is useful to think of common boundaries between the communities as a 
neighborhood definition. In other words, if community i has a common border with community j we 
consider them as neighbors. This type of spatial weight matrix is called a contiguity spatial weight matrix 
which is defined as follows: 
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� 
The contiguity spatial weight matrix contains all neighborhood information about the common borders of 
different communities. The row and columns are symmetric, i.e. observation 1 represents one community, 
observation 2 another community, etc. The diagonal values of the matrix are 0 since we rule out intra-
community distance (LeSage and Pace, 2009). The single elements 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 of the matrix can take two values, 
either 0 or 1, defining: 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 1       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑗𝑗0       𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                          
When the value is zero, then community i and j are not sharing a common boundary whereas when the 
value is one, community i and community j share a common boundary and can be considered neighbors. 
There are several ways to define the spatial weight matrix, for example we could use an inverse distance 
weight matrix where each element of the matrix denotes the inverse distance between two objects. 
However as we have administrative regions we find the contiguity matrix is a natural choice for our 
research question.  
 
3.2.2 Testing for Spatial Autocorrelation 
The contiguity definition of neighborhood from the previous section can now be used to detect and test 
for spatial autocorrelation. The most common measure for spatial autocorrelation is Moran’s I test 
statistics which was introduced by Moran (1950) and further developed by Cliff and Ord (1973, 1981). 
Moran’s I statistics can be calculated as follows (Getis, 2010). 
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑛𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖−𝑦𝑦�)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖−𝑦𝑦�)
∑ (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖−𝑦𝑦�)2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1    ;    𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗   (1) 
The variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  represents the variable of interest for a geographical observation i, in our study 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  is the 
stock of gambling supply in community i. The Moran statistics is a test for spatial randomness which means 
that we reject the null hypothesis if spatial autocorrelation is present and accept it when there is no spatial 
autocorrelation. Similar to Pearson’s correlation the value for Moran’s test statistics ranges from minus 
one to one. Positive autocorrelation indicates clustering values and negative autocorrelation indicates 
diffusion. Moran’s I statistics is useful to determine the spatial autocorrelation for single variables but does 
not allow a more distinct analysis with several control variables. For example the spatial autocorrelation 
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of EGMs could be also affected by other covariates, like the socioeconomic environment of a region. Since 
Moran’s I does not consider the partial effects of other covariates on the spatial autocorrelation of the 
variable of interest we will introduce spatial econometric models in the following section. 
 
3.2.3 Spatial Econometric Modelling 
The next logical step is to model spatial autocorrelation in a way that other covariates are considered in 
the analysis. Spatial econometric models allow to disentangle heterogeneities across observations and 
assess spatial autocorrelation in a controlled setup. In the spatial econometric framework, spatial 
dependence reflects a situation where values observed for one region i depend on the values of 
neighboring observations at nearby regions j and vice versa (LeSage and Pace, 2009). This is a stronger 
concept in contrast to spatial autocorrelation where we simply observe an association between proximate 
observations. Spatial dependence can be implemented in the classical linear regression model in two 
major ways (Elhorst, 2010).5 First, spatial dependence is present in the dependent variable, therefore one 
can add the neighbor values of the variable of interest as an additional explanatory variable (spatial lag 
model) and second, there is spatial dependence in the error term (spatial error model). The combination 
of both models is called the Kelejian-Prucha Model (KPM). Spatial econometric models are similar to 
traditional linear regression, with the addition that they allow modeling spatial interaction, help to uncover 
spatial patterns, reduce estimation bias and increase estimation efficiency (LeSage and Pace, 2009). These 
models are widely used in economics and social science if the research question has a geographical context 
or requires to assess neighborhood effects, externalities and detect hot spots. For example Anselin et al. 
(2000) use spatial econometric methods to analyze the concentration of crime rates and the spill-over 
effects of crime on neighboring regions, Breustedt and Habermann (2011) apply spatial techniques in 
agricultural economics and explain differences in farmland prices and Schündeln (2014) models the spatial 
mobility of migrants across communities in Germany. Although there is some location-based gambling 
literature which tackles the gambling market from a geographical perspective like Economopoulos (2015), 
Pearce et al. (2008) and Wardle et al. (2014), to the best of our knowledge no one used spatial techniques 
to analyze the clustering of EGM supply. We will briefly introduce the major spatial econometric models 
in the next session. 
                                                          
5 There can be also spatial dependence in the independent variables. LeSage and Pace (2009) suggest this approach 
to model externalities which is not the focus of our research. 
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3.2.4 Spatial Lag Model (SLM) 
When there is an autocorrelation in the dependent variable Y, the spatial lag model (SLM) is applied which 
includes average lagged values of the neighbors to the regression (Anselin, 1988). In the context of our 
research setup this means that the number of EGMs in one region is influenced by the number of EGM of 
the neighboring regions and vice versa. If a target community is surrounded by communities which have a 
high EGM supply, the EGM supply of the target community will be positively enhanced by its neighbors 
which leads to a similarly high EGM supply in the target community. On the opposite a target community 
with low EGM supply neighbors will be positively affected by the low supply which then dampens the EGM 
supply in the target community. For the notation we follow LeSage and Pace (2009), equation (2) illustrates 
a simple SLM model. 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑣𝑣   (2) 
Y is an N x 1 vector for our depended variable where N is the total number of communities in our sample 
(N = 396). The variable W is an N x N contiguity spatial weight matrix. Furthermore, X is an N x K vector of 
explanatory variables similar to regular regression analysis and u is an independent and identically 
distributed N x 1 error term. The model has two coefficients, the first coefficient 𝜆𝜆 is the spatial lag 
coefficient. This is the core coefficient for our analysis, it determines the strength and direction of EGM 
clustering comparable to spatial autocorrelation. This parameter can be interpreted as the contagion 
effect since it implies that neighboring supply affects the supply of the target community. When a 
clustering of EGM supply is expected, 𝜆𝜆 takes a positive value. A negative value indicates no clustering but 
rather a dispersed EGM supply while an insignificant coefficient states that there is no structure in the 
EGM supply, i.e. there is neither a clustering nor a dispersion. The second model parameter 𝑋𝑋 is a K x 1 
coefficient vector for the corresponding exogenous variables. The term 𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌 is defined as the spatial lag 
term, it applies the neighborhood structure from W onto the dependent variable Y. 
 
3.2.5 Spatial Error Model (SEM) 
The spatial error model is applied when there is spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of the OLS model. 
The regression function now includes a spatial lagged structure for the errors which is referred to as spatial 
heterogeneity. 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑣𝑣    (3) 
𝑣𝑣 = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑣𝑣 + 𝜀𝜀    (4) 
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The coefficient 𝜌𝜌 represents the strength and direction of the spatial structure in the error and 𝜀𝜀 is normal 
and i.i.d. white noise. The model assumes an autocorrelation in the error term and not in the dependent 
or any of the independent variables. It can be interpreted as a weighted average of the individual residuals 
of neighboring areas. 
 
3.2.6 Kelejian-Prucha Model (KPM) 
When there is a lag in the dependent variable as well as in the error term we have to use the Kelejian-
Prucha Model which combines the SLM and SEM to one model.  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑣𝑣  (4) 
𝑣𝑣 = 𝜌𝜌𝑣𝑣 + 𝜀𝜀   (5) 
This model is particularly useful to disentangle the spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable while 
controlling for spatial heterogeneity in the error term. The parameter estimation of SLM, SEM and KPM is 
based on the maximum likelihood estimation introduced by Ord (1970) for spatial econometric models. 
There are also other estimation methods like the general method of moments and instrument variable 
estimators but for simplicity we restrict our estimation to the maximum likelihood approach and apply the 
model selection criteria proposed by LeSage and Pace (2009). For the estimation we follow Drukker et al. 
(2013a, 2013b) in STATA. 
 
3.3 Data 
The analysis aims to analyze spatial clustering of EGM gambling activity across communities in the German 
state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). It is important to highlight that observations can differ with regard 
to their aggregation level: a single house or gambling arcade in a certain street can be considered as the 
lowest aggregation level, the number of EGMs in communities or municipalities is a medium aggregation 
level and the stock of EGMs in states or countries is a high level of aggregation, this issue is known as the 
Modified Area Unit Problem (MAUP). For the data selection it is essential to choose the right balance 
between low aggregation and data availability. For a clean analysis of spatial clustering of EGMs it is 
necessary to have as many neighboring observations of EGM arcades as possible, on the other hand low 
aggregation comes along with a lack of data availability. For example we could employ the analysis for 
single EGM arcades with precise location coordinates, however doing so we won’t be able to include the 
socioeconomic environment of a single arcade because of lacking or incomplete data. While we have good 
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data coverage for socioeconomic variables on the community and state level, socioeconomic data for 
single locations is hardly available. Therefore, we focus for our analysis on German communities within 
the state of NRW since they offer a variety of observable socioeconomic and geographic characteristics as 
well as a good regional variation in the stock of EGMs among the communities.  
The state of NRW is the largest of sixteen German states and lies in western Germany. We analyze this 
particular state for a number of reasons. First, it is the most populated state in Germany with 17.5 million 
people which accommodates nearly a quarter of Germany’s total population. Second, it is a densely 
populated state with the largest metropolitan area in Germany covering major cities like Cologne and 
Düsseldorf. The state consists of 396 communities which are populated by an average of 44.000 residents 
each. Third, for the analysis of spatial clustering in the EGM market we require a contiguous dataset i.e. it 
is necessary to gather EGM data for each community within that state so that we can construct a complete 
map of gambling activity without missing spots.  
 
Figure 3.2: Germany, the state of NRW and communities in NRW 
Only very few states have complete coverage of the stock of EGMs for each community, NRW is an 
exception and has nearly complete EGM data. Germany and in particular NRW are ideal to study spatial 
clustering of EGMs because it is densely populated, has short travel distances from one community to the 
neighboring communities as well as a high number of communities.  
We construct a cross-section dataset which uses three data sources from the years 2011 and 2012. For the 
stock of EGMs per community we employ data by Trümper and Heimann (2014). They conduct a survey 
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among local regulatory agencies which maintains records on nearly all legal EGMs in the communities. 
From Trümper and Heimann we draw our gambling supply variables for the year 2012. We correlate the 
total number of EGMs with the population of a community and find a coefficient of 0.98. We conclude that 
an analysis in absolute terms is misleading and therefore standardize the EGMs supply per community to 
one thousand residents, so that we obtain an EGM supply density.   
To sharpen our analysis of EGM clustering previous studies suggest to include regional control variables 
which allow a more distinct description of the socioeconomic environment in the regions of interest and 
therefore increase the validity of the study. The socioeconomic environment plays a crucial role with 
regard to the gambling activity within a region (Wheeler et al. (2006), Pearce et al. (2008), Wardle et al. 
(2012)). The source for the socioeconomic variables is the EU population and housing census for Germany 
in the year 2011. We standardize each socioeconomic variable to one thousand residents for the same 
reason as we standardized the EGM supply. Furthermore, we distinguish between rural and urban areas 
by implementing a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the region has less than 10.000 residents.
  
As a third data source, we include the effect of motorway service station (MSS) gambling activity into our 
analysis by counting the number of motorway service stations within each community. This idea is rather 
new and has not been used in the gambling literature so far. Truck drivers in Germany are obliged to take 
a compulsory break after eight hours of driving for the rest of the day. These breaks are usually done at 
motorway service stations. Besides snacks and beverages service stations also offer the opportunity to 
play EGMs. We assume that truck drivers are mostly not resident in the community in which they make 
their break, but their gambling activity will be still addressed to the hosting community. The motorway 
gambling has to be included into the analysis because bypassing truckers can affect the number of 
gamblers in a region, but are not included in the number of residents per community. We expect that the 
number of motorway service stations should positively affect the number of EGM within a community. We 
collected the location of each motorway service station in NRW and assign them to the corresponding 
community. A detailed description of our variables can be found in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Variable overview 
Variable Measure Mean Std. Error 
 
(1) EGM variables 
 
   
 EGM absolute Number of EGMs per community 
 
162.44 18.47 
 EGM relative Number of EGMs per 1000 residents per 
community 
 
2.73 0.09 
(2) Socioeconomic and 
geographic variables 
 
   
 Population Number of residents 
 
44288.52 4338.03 
 Male 
 
Density of males 490.14 0.39 
 Unemployed 
 
Density of unemployed  
 
30.00 0.58 
 Migrant Density of immigrants 
 
47.84 1.26 
 No school degree Density of residents without education 
 
68.15 1.26 
 Secondary degree I Density of residents with a secondary degree I 
(10 years of education) 
555.96 2.30 
  
 Secondary degree II 
 
Density of residents with a secondary degree II 
(12-13 years of education) 
139.21 2.23 
    
 Young age Density of residents between 18 – 24 years 81.09 0.40 
 Density of residents between 25 – 29 years 
 
50.52 0.39 
 Married 
 
Density of married residents 489.50 1.11 
 Single 
 
Density of singles 378.49 1.21 
 Divorced Density of divorced 
 
60.14 0.60 
 Rural area dummy = 1 if less than 10.000 residents in community 
= 0 if more than 10.000 residents in community 
 
0.14 0.02 
 MSS Number of motorway service stations in a 
community 
 
0.17 0.03 
Note: All densities are standardized per 1000 residents. Example: For the variable ‘Unemployed’, 30 residents are 
unemployed per 1000 residents.   
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3.4 Results 
The main objective of this study is to understand the spatial clustering of EGM supply. Previously Fig. 1 
illustrated potential EGM clustering across communities, the next step is to test this initial result 
analytically by using Moran’s I test statistics in Table 3.2. First, we analyze the spatial autocorrelation for 
the absolute number of EGMs per community. We find moderate and significant clustering of the variable 
EGM absolute. Moran’s I statistics shows an autocorrelation of .271 (0.028). For the variable EGM relative, 
i.e. the EGMs per 1000 residents, we still find a highly significant clustering but the autocorrelation is now 
less severe and takes a values of .101 (0.030). Although the clustering of EGM relative is weaker we find 
that the absolute and the relative EGM supply show significant positive spatial autocorrelation at the 1% 
level. The result is straightforward: there is significant clustering of EGM activity across regions, even when 
we look at the population adjusted relative supply.  
Table 3.2: Spatial autocorrelation for the number of EGMs per community (absolute) and the number of 
EGMs per thousand residents per community (relative) 
Variable Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Significance 
 
EGM absolute 
 
 
0.271 (0.028) *** 
 
0.000 
EGM relative  0.101 (0.030) *** 0.001 
***1% significant ; ** 5% significant; * 10% significant 
This result supports the contagion argument, however from the literature we expect significant variation 
in the EGM supply depending on the socioeconomic and geographical composition of the communities. 
Table 3.3 represents our major results from the regression analysis. For all regressions we used the relative 
EGM supply as the dependent variable. First we estimated the OLS residuals and included several control 
variables. Our estimation was overall significant and had a moderate R2 of 0.41. The second column shows 
the results from the SLM model. With the inclusion of the control variables we do not find a significant 
spatial clustering anymore. The spatial lag coefficient λ has a very weak value of 0.003 which is not 
significantly different from zero. The third column illustrates the SEM results, we find a highly significant 
autocorrelation in the error term indicating some spatial heterogeneity across regions.  
The last column shows the findings for the KPM model. We can see that the combined model is the most 
likely model. Furthermore, in the KPM setup the spatial lag coefficient λ changed magnitude but remains 
insignificant. The spatial error is still present and significant.  
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The coefficient of the control variables present some insight on the gambling supply in different regions. 
All four models show a lower gambling supply in regions with higher education levels (secondary degree 
II), we also find significantly higher gambling activity in regions where many young adults in the age from 
25 to 29 live. The highest coefficient in our analysis has the rural dummy variable, which ranges from -0.94 
to -0.98 depending on the underlying model. This result indicates that rural regions with less than 10.000 
residents have on average approximately one gambling machine less per 1000 residents than urban areas, 
this result is highly significant and consistent across all models. Furthermore, we find weakly significant 
evidence for higher EGM supply in regions with higher unemployment rates which is in line with other 
literature. There is also weak evidence for the male variable indicating that gender does not play a role in 
our aggregated framework. The marital status composition and the density of migrants in a region are 
insignificant in our analysis. We also find a positive effect of the motorway service stations on the relative 
EGM supply in the OLS and the KPM models. Although the coefficient is moderately high (0.2), the standard 
errors are quite high as well. A larger sample size could further improve the significance of the motorway 
service station effect and should be further analyzed in other works. 
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Table 3.3: Regression results 
Dependent variable EGM supply per 
1000 residents 
OLS SLM SEM KPM 
(1) Spatial lag variables 
 
    
 Spatial lag 𝜆𝜆 - 0.003 
(0.010)  
- -0.023 
(0.014) 
 Spatial error 𝜌𝜌 - - 0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.052***  
(0.017) 
(2) Control Variables 
 
    
 Male 
 
- 0.029* 
(0.016) 
 
- 0.029** 
(0.015) 
 
- 0.029** 
(0.015) 
 
- 0.030** 
(0.015) 
 
 Unemployed 
 
0.020**  
(0.010) 
 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
 
0.019* 
(0.012) 
 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
 
 Migrant 0.001  
(0.005) 
 
0.001  
(0.004) 
 
0.000  
(0.004) 
 
- 0.0001 
(0.004) 
 No school degree - 0.009  
(0.008) 
 
- 0.009  
(0.008) 
 
- 0.010  
(0.009) 
 
0.012  
(0.009) 
 
 Secondary degree I - 0.006*  
(0.003) 
 
- 0.006 
(0.004) 
 
- 0.006 
(0.004) 
 
- 0.006 
(0.004) 
 
 Secondary degree II - 0.014***  
(0.004)  
- 0.014***  
(0.005) 
- 0.014***  
(0.005) 
- 0.013***  
(0.005) 
 Young age 18-24 - 0.002 
(0.013) 
 
- 0.002 
(0.015) 
 
- 0.003 
(0.015) 
 
- 0.006 
(0.015) 
 
 Young age 25-29 0.037***  
(0.015) 
 
0.036** 
(0.017) 
 
0.039*** 
(0.017) 
 
0.043** 
(0.018) 
 
 Married 
 
- 0.016 
(0.011) 
 
- 0.016 
(0.012) 
 
- 0.015 
(0.012) 
 
- 0.014 
(0.013) 
 
 Single 
 
- 0.013 
(0.011) 
 
- 0.013 
(0.012) 
 
- 0.012 
(0.012) 
 
- 0.012 
(0.012) 
 
 Divorced 0.015 
(0.015) 
 
0.015 
(0.017) 
 
0.018 
(0.017) 
 
0.020 
(0.017) 
 Rural Area Dummy - 0.964*** 
(0.299) 
 
- 0.962*** 
(0.260) 
 
- 0.982*** 
(0.260) 
 
- 0.983*** 
(0.259) 
 MSS 0.211* 
(0.112)  
 
0.208 
(0.127)  
0.200 
(0.125)  
0.215* 
(0.114)  
 
 𝑅𝑅2  0.412 - - - 
 Log-likelihood - - 686.94 - 684.24 - 682.88 
 N = 396     
 
***1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the clustering of gambling machines in the German state of NRW. We distinguished 
between the absolute EGM supply and the relative EGM supply. A first visual inspection showed that EGM 
supply, absolute and relative, is spatially correlated which indicates a highly clustered EGM supply. This 
result was confirmed by Moran’s I test. A spatial econometric framework was used and included several 
control variables to disentangle the initial clustering effect. We found that the relative EGM supply is 
significantly lower in regions with higher education status and significantly higher in regions with higher 
unemployment rates and larger shares of young adults. This result is consistent with previous studies. We 
find that gambling activity is significantly lower in rural regions compared to urban regions. We also 
introduced the effect of motorway service station gambling activity which weakly affects the gambling 
supply of a region. Finally our spatial econometric analysis shows that the clustering and contagion of EGM 
supply is mostly explained by the demographic and geographic composition of a region. After controlling 
for those factors we find no significant clustering of EGM supply in all of our models. In other words the 
initial clustering effect is completely erased in a distinct framework which provides evidence that potential 
contagion of EGM supply across communities does not exist.  
Our study can be extended in several ways. First, we used a cross section data set to explain the EGM 
supply by the characteristics of a region. In order to clarify the direction of causality and to delete 
heterogeneity which we observed in our SEM and KPM model a panel data framework should be 
considered. Second, we focused on the demographic composition of the region, however other supply and 
demand factors should be included into the analysis. For example we expect that rental costs or the venue 
price are substantial factors for EGM arcade location choice as well as regional tax differences. These 
variables should be incorporated into this framework. Third, we analyzed the clustering effect on the 
community level, this analysis should be extended to other aggregation levels (e.g. nationwide) to obtain 
further insight and more consistent results. Overall it can be said that spatial econometric modelling is 
very useful to analyze EGM supply and should be extended to other markets as well. 
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ABSTRACT 
During the last few years, Europe has faced an unprecedented influx of immigrants, commonly known as 
the refugee crisis. The refugee crisis was the major topic in the 2016 German state elections. This paper 
studies whether immigration in voter’s neighbourhoods is a driving factor of the rise of Germany’s major 
right-wing party Alternative fuer Deutschland (AFD) and the decline of Angela Merkel’s centre ruling party 
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). We use the 2015 refugee crisis as a natural experiment to study 
the short-run impact of refugee presence on the voting behaviour in German municipalities. This is the 
first study to use a spatial econometric framework combining small-scale immigration data, election data, 
and a set of socio-economic factors. Our main finding states that the local immigration boosted AFD votes 
but did not affect CDU votes directly. Instead, the CDU gained fewer votes in regions which perceived 
immigration indirectly, i.e. had higher immigration in neighbouring municipalities. 
  
                                                          
6 This article has been submitted to the IZA Journal of Development and Migration and is currently under revision. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the world has faced the second largest refugee movement since World War II. The increase 
in immigration is largely due to the high numbers of refugees who escape from the Syrian civil war and an 
increasingly instable Middle East.7 Immigration to Europe, and in particular to Germany, was further 
fostered in autumn 2015 when German chancellor Angela Merkel gave Syrian refugees permission to 
travel from the EU border to Germany.8 As a result, the total number of registered asylum seekers in 
Germany reached 1.1 million by the end of 2015 (BAMF, 2016). The refugee influx came suddenly and left 
little room for an elaborate public debate, which could have illuminated chances and potential risks of the 
arriving immigrants. Throughout the critical year 2015, the majority of politicians as well as the 
mainstream media followed Merkel’s refugee-friendly stance and ignored potential negative aspects of 
immigration which fuelled popularity of the right spectre (Haller, 2017). Merkel’s ruling centre party, the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), unilaterally promoted the advantages of immigration and downplayed 
potential risks and economic burdens caused by the refugee influx. Shortly after the immigration influx, a 
federal election took place in spring 2016. The election acted as an evaluation of the immigration policy 
from the previous year and the refugee crisis was the major election topic in 2016. Angela Merkel was the 
tragic protagonist of the election. Her party lost one quarter of votes while Germany’s major right-wing 
party, the Alternative fuer Deutschland (AFD), tripled the votes and became the third largest party. The 
election outcome evokes the research question for this paper. Did the local presence of refugees in the 
municipalities lead to the rise of the German right-wing and the downfall of Angela Merkel and the CDU 
party? In other words, did micro-level exposure to refugees increase local right-wing voting and decrease 
CDU voting, or was the development a trend which is independent of the refugee allocation? Our research 
question contributes to the rising interest in the influence of immigration on election outcomes. The 
refugee influx in 2015 acts as an ideal natural experiment to study the effect of a sudden immigration 
shock on short-run voting behaviour. The event is similar to other famous immigration shocks, such as the 
Marial Boatlift from 1980 in the sense that a large number of immigrants from one predominant ethnic 
group migrate in a short period of time to a certain location. The predominant ethnic group, which 
accounts for 35.9 per cent of the total immigration in 2015, were Syrians (BAMF, 2016).  
                                                          
7 For the sake of simplicity, we will not distinguish whether an asylum seeker is already a registered refugee, is still in 
the registration process, or has not been registered yet but claims to receive refugee status at some time. Since the 
registration of asylum seekers is an ongoing process, we will refer to all three groups as refugees. 
8 Merkel allowed refugees to travel from Hungary to Germany by train over increasing tensions in Hungary. According 
to the then German Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière, Merkel gave order to the border police on 
4 September 2015 to let refugees pass. This decision is a violation of the Dublin regulation which obliges asylum 
seekers to register at the borders of the EU. 
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The refugee crisis is a unique natural experiment for two reasons. First, within a year, more than one 
million immigrants arrived in Germany, which is the highest immigration number to a single European 
country in recent history. The sheer mass of people required quick allocation and housing solutions. The 
housing market does not provide the necessary volume of accommodations at a sufficiently low price. 
Hence, the refugee allocation was managed by the German government. Since vacancies were scarce, new 
refugee shelters were built and existing houses were converted to refugee homes. This situation creates 
a quasi-experimental setting, because most of the contemporary refugee accommodation were either 
non-existent or served another purpose before the immigration influx in 2014. Second, the refugee crisis 
was the main topic in German media throughout 2015/2016 and the major political issue in the elections 
in spring 2016. Due to the catenation of events, the ensuing election acts as an evaluation of the refugee 
influx and the deciding factor at the ballot box during the 2016 election (Haller, 2017). Although 
immigration and the refugee crisis were still subject of discussion in later elections, the issue was most 
important during the spring elections of 2016, shortly after immigration peaked. Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
uneven distribution of refugee accommodations and the AFD vote shares in 2016 for a total number of 
1,101 municipalities in the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW). Sixty-one per cent of the 
municipalities accommodate refugees, while thirty-nine per cent do not accommodate refugees.9 Our 
identification strategy exploits the regional variation of refugee settlement, voting behaviour, and socio-
economic differences among the municipalities in the state of BW. We use a spatial econometric 
framework, which allows modelling spill-over-effects among the regions and reduces estimation bias. The 
framework is able to model two channels through which refugee presence can influence election 
outcomes directly and indirectly. We distinguish between direct refugee presence, i.e. the backyard effect, 
and indirect refugee presence, i.e. the neighbourhood effect. The backyard effect measures how the 
number of refugees within a municipality affect the election outcome, while the neighbourhood effect 
describes how the number of refugees in neighbouring municipalities affects the election outcome. Both 
effects are measures for the degree of refugee presence through physical distance. While the first effect 
expresses direct proximity, the second effect measures the influence of immigration to neighbouring 
municipalities, which are further away but still close enough to be perceivable for voters. Although there 
is a rising number of literature which studies the influence of immigration on voting behaviour, to the best 
                                                          
9 The distribution among German counties follows a distribution scheme, namely, the Koenigssteiner Schluessel, 
which directs more refugees to higher populated federal states with higher tax incomes. However, the scheme does 
not apply to municipalities within the states, which results in an increasingly uneven distribution. 
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of our knowledge, there is no paper that investigates how physical presence of immigrants affects voting 
behaviour directly and indirectly.  
 
Figure 4.1: (a) The number of refugee accommodations per 1,000 residents, and (b) the AfD vote shares in 
2016 in Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW) 
 
4.1.1 Immigration and Voting Behaviour 
Recent literature shows mixed evidence for the effects of immigration on voting behaviour. A significant 
share finds a positive relationship between right-wing voting and immigration (Barone et al., 2016; Halla, 
Wagner and Zweimüller, 2017; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014). Barone et al. (2016) exploit municipality-level 
data using an IV estimation strategy to analyse the impact of immigrants on the centre-right and centre-
left parties in Italy. They conclude that immigration causes an increase in votes for the centre-right 
coalition. This result is accompanied by a loss of votes for centre and centre-left parties as well as lower 
turnout rates. Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller (2017) study the influence of immigration on Austria’s major 
right-wing party (FPOE). They find significantly higher vote shares for FPOE in regions with higher migration 
inflows. They argue that voters are concerned about the labour market effects as well as a decline in 
quality of their neighbourhood caused by immigration. There are also some studies which find either no 
relationship or a negative relationship between right-wing parties and immigration (Gehrsitz and Ungerer, 
2017; Steinmayr, 2016; Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Damm, 2016). The studies by Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2017) 
and Steinmayr (2016) focus on the 2016 refugee crisis as well. Gehrsitz and Ungerer analyse the short-run 
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effects of refugee exposure on AFD vote shares in Germany using county level data. Their analysis suggests 
that regions with higher refugee presence had no significantly different AFD vote shares than regions with 
lower refugee presence. Although using county level data is common practice in political geography, it 
allows vague conclusions about micro-level exposure to refugees due to an aggregation bias.10 
Steinmayr (2016) deals with this bias by using municipality level data from the 2015 federal state elections 
in Austria. He uses an IV approach and defines pre-existing group accommodations as an instrument for 
refugee presence. Steinmayr’s findings suggest that municipalities, which hosted more refugees, exhibited 
lower vote shares for Austria’s major right-wing party.11 These results are in contrast with the anti-
immigration surge in Austria at the macro level. He argues that micro exposure to refugees increases the 
sympathy for refugees and therefore dampens local right-wing voting. However, the results are in line with 
the contact hypothesis which states that the interaction between members from different (racial) groups 
can reduce prejudice and discrimination (Allport, 1954; Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux, 2005; Ellison, Shin 
and Lael, 2011). Although the IV approach is a useful tool to reduce endogeneity, Steinmayr’s instrument 
is potentially flawed, because group accommodations have a limited ability to represent the true refugee 
presence. One innovation in our paper is the interaction between spatially distributed variables. While 
most of the literature makes a commendable effort to discuss potential endogeneity between immigration 
and voting behaviour, the majority ignores the spatial dimension. Figure 4.1 shows how regions with high 
AFD vote shares are located in a “circle” around the Stuttgart metropolitan area. Hence, it is evident that 
AFD vote shares are not randomly distributed. Ignoring this fact is another source of bias. We tackle the 
shortcomings of the literature in three ways: First, we use municipality level data which is finer scaled than 
county level data. Second, we use factually recorded refugee settlement data instead of proxy variables. 
Third, we implement a spatial econometric framework which accounts for biased estimates that result 
from misspecification of the spatial structure.  
4.1.2 Socioeconomic Environment and Voting Behaviour 
Several studies show that immigration is not the sole cause for the rise of right-wing parties and political 
polarisation. Demographic differences such as race, gender, and age as well as economic prosperity 
measures such as income and unemployment crystallise as important factors for the decision at the ballot 
box. According to the Kramer model (Kramer, 1971; Kiewiet and Udell, 1998), high income and low 
unemployment increase the chance of re-election of the ruling party. Hersh and Nall (2016) argue that 
voting behaviour in the US is a function of income as well as ethnic and racial heterogeneity. Furthermore, 
                                                          
10 For further information, see: “Modifiable area unit problem” (MAUP). 
11 The major Austrian right-wing party is the Freedom of Austria (FPOE) party. 
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they conclude that partisanship is stronger in regions with higher cultural diversity. Noelle-Neumann 
(1980) explains that individuals with socially and economically unprivileged background, i.e. individuals 
with low income or unemployed, are more likely to elect opposition parties. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 
(2006) argue that political polarisation coincides with income inequality in the US. Garand (2010) argues 
that both major US parties’, i.e. the Democrats’ and the Republicans’, ideological positions are more 
polarised during times of higher inequality in the US. Hence, the ideological positions of parties are a 
function of state-income inequality. Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2016) study political extremism after 
financial crises for different European countries during the period between 1870 and 2014. They argue 
that right-wing parties increased their vote share significantly after financial crises while government 
majorities shrank. Financial crises induce a reallocation of wealth which can disrupt political ideology. 
Han (2016) analyses links between income and voter support for radical right-wing parties in Western 
Europe. He concludes that individuals with lower income are more likely to vote for radical right-wing 
parties. Furthermore, he finds a positive, yet weakly significant link between right-wing voting and 
unemployment. Krieckhaus et al. (2014) study the effect of higher income disparity on the support for 
democracy in general. They describe opposing forces, which can either increase or decrease the support 
for democratic parties. On the one hand, increasing income inequality could strengthen support for 
democratic parties as democracies can work as an income redistribution mechanism. On the other hand, 
they argue that inequality can induce a “political disillusion” which leads to dissatisfaction and ultimately 
passes voters into the hands of right-wing parties. They inspect forty democracies and find that an 
increased inequality reduces the acceptance of democracy among all social classes. Dahlberg, Edmark and 
Lundqvist (2012) study the relationship between increased immigration and preference for wealth 
redistribution in Sweden. They find a significant negative influence of immigration on the support for 
redistribution. This effect is particularly strong among high-income earners. Hence, high-income earners 
are more likely to oppose financial support for refugees as well. Following the literature, we include a set 
of socioeconomic control variables to account for political preferences among various social milieus. 
4.2 Background and Data 
For a better understanding, it is useful to shed some light on the political landscape in Germany. In 2016, 
there were five federal state elections in Germany, namely in Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW), Berlin, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt. Due to incomplete or lacking 
data regarding the latter four states, we restrict the analysis to the largest of the five states, namely, 
Baden-Wuerttemberg. The state of BW has a population of 10.9 million which corresponds to 13 per cent 
of the total German population. BW is divided in 1,101 municipalities with an average of 9,900 residents 
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per municipality. For the analysis, we chose the election year 2016 due to its temporal closeness to the 
refugee crisis.12 Since the election took place during spring of 2016, it is considered an immediate policy 
evaluation of the preceding refugee crisis (Haller, 2017). The majority of all votes were split among four 
parties. The Green Party (30.3%), the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU, 27%), the right-wing 
Alternative fuer Deutschland (AFD, 15.1%) and the Social Democrats (SPD, 12.7%).13 These four parties 
gathered eighty-five per cent of all votes which makes them the key parties in the election. During the 
refugee crisis, Angela Merkel of CDU stood out politically as the main proponent of immigration and the 
leader of the ruling coalition. The CDU party was the main loser in the 2016 election since they lost twelve 
percentage points. The Green Party is the ruling party in the state of BW but not a ruling party in 
parliament. Although the Green Party won the 2016 election in BW, it is not accountable for the refugee 
crisis at the federal level where it acts as an opposition party. The right-wing AFD party is a successful 
newcomer that was founded in 2013. Within three years, the party tripled its votes and became the third 
largest party in the federal election 2016. In comparison to the other parties, the AFD openly opposed the 
long-term settlement of refugees in Germany. The Greens and SPD were either supporting Angela Merkel’s 
immigration-friendly policy or remained vague in their political positions throughout 2015 and spring of 
2016. As a conclusion, we focus on two parties of interest: Angela Merkel’s CDU and the right-wing AFD 
party. Both parties were in the spotlight throughout the crisis with the AFD acting as Germany’s major 
anti-immigration party and the CDU being the ruling party and holding responsibility for the crisis. Recent 
literature shows that the AFD and CDU party were the key players in the immigration debate in the 2016 
elections (Haller, 2017).14 
For our analysis, we require three categories of data: election data, refugee settlement data, and 
socioeconomic data at the municipality level. Voting data is made available by the Federal Statistical Office 
of Baden-Wuerttemberg (FSOBW, 2016). We measure the election outcome for each party in percentage 
points per municipality. Furthermore, we include the vote share of the 2013 election to control for 
previous election outcomes, where refugees had not been an issue yet. We also account for the election 
turnout rate from previous elections since the refugee crisis might have mobilised non-voters to vote. 
Table 4.1 gives a variable overview. Second, the Ministry of Social Policy and Integration provided refugee 
settlement data. We measure the immigration shock by the number of refugee accommodations per 
                                                          
12 The federal state election in Baden-Wuerttemberg was held on 13 March 2016. 
13 The Green Party is the ruling party in Baden-Wuerttemberg. It was an opposition party in the German parliament 
at the date of the  
14 We have tested this hypothesis and found no significant impact of refugee presence on the green party as well as 
the social democrat party election outcomes. 
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municipality. The record date is March 2016, shortly before the state election took place. We do not 
distinguish between newly-built refugee shelters and existing buildings that were converted into refugee 
accommodations. At the record date, there were 2,452 refugee accommodations in BW hosting a total 
number of 185,000 refugees. This makes an average of 2.23 refugee locations per municipality and an 
average refugee exposure of 168 refugees per municipality. As the population and the number of refugee 
locations are correlated (r = .70), we standardise refugee accommodations per one thousand residents.  
Table 4.1: Variable overview and descriptive statistics 
Variables Measure Mean Std. Dev. 
    
 Ref home 
  
Refugee accommodations per 1,000 residents 0.26 0.35 
policy variables    
 AFD 16 Vote share of the AFD party in state election 2016  
in percentage points 
 
15.35 3.69 
 CDU 16  
 
Vote share of the CDU party in state election 2016  
in percentage points 
 
31.10 7.15 
 AFD 13 Vote share of the AFD party in parliamentary 
election 2013 in percentage points 
5.21 1.35 
    
 CDU 13 
 
Vote share of the CDU party in parliamentary 
election 2013 in percentage points 
  
50.18 6.87 
 
 Turnout rate Turnout rate in the parliamentary election in 2013  
in percentage points  
 
71.93 4.93 
socioeconomic controls    
 GDP Gross domestic product per 1,000 residents (in €) 
 
35.57 7.16 
 Unemployment Unemployment rate in percentage points 
 
3.74 0.53 
 Mean age 
 
Mean age of the population 43.53 1.64 
 Males  
 
Male population per 1,000 residents 495.10 12.01 
 Married 
 
Married population per 1,000 residents 486.09 23.30 
 Population density 
 
The number of residents per hectare 3.24 3.45 
 Migrant background German citizens with migrant background per 1,000 
residents 
 
160.45 42.07 
 Low education 
 
Highest degree = Basic education (second step) per 
1,000 residents  
337.87 35.71 
     
N = 1,101  
 
Third, the Federal Statistical Office of Baden-Wuerttemberg and the Federal Institute for Employment 
Research provided socioeconomic data. We include a set of socioeconomic control variables to account 
for voting differences among social groups. The main variables are GDP per municipality, the 
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unemployment rate, mean age, gender, marital status, the share of residents with immigration 
background, and the share of residents with basic education. We also include the population density per 
hectare to distinguish between rural and urban voting preferences. Although panel data is undoubtedly 
an integral part to reduce endogeneity, it fails to address our research question. There are two reasons for 
which we chose a cross section approach. First, the AFD party became an anti-immigration party in recent 
years. It evolved from a Euro-sceptic party, which focused on European economic policy, to a right-wing 
party with a restrictive stance towards immigration. In other words, voters who oppose immigration did 
not necessarily vote for the AFD party in 2013. Against this backdrop, it is unreasonable to compare 
election outcomes from 2013 and 2016. Second, the party was established in 2013 and participated in only 
two federal elections, i.e. 2013 and 2017. As for the state elections, the party participated in only one 
election cycle. Due to the recent transition in AFD’s political agenda and the lack of election periods, we 
chose a cross section approach. 
4.3 Model and Empirical Implementation 
Using municipality level data, we build a simple model where the vote share for a political party depends 
on the number of refugee accommodations and a set of policy and socioeconomic control variable. The 
policy and socioeconomic control variables are pooled in variable 𝑋𝑋. 
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 + 𝑋𝑋 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑣𝑣   (1) 
We exploit the variation among 𝑖𝑖 municipalities. The parameter 𝛼𝛼1 is the marginal effect of refugee 
presence (backyard effect), the parameter vector 𝑋𝑋 represents the influence of socioeconomic, political 
and regional control variables. Since all the data has a spatial context, i.e. all variables are attributes of 
spatial units, we must account for spatial spill-overs among the variables. Ignoring a spatial structure by 
assuming randomness will lead to biased and inefficient coefficients (Anselin, 1988). This makes spatial 
econometric techniques necessary for estimation. Non-randomness in space can occur when, for example, 
right-wing voting concentrates in a certain neighbourhood resulting in right-wing voting clusters. Another 
advantage of spatial models is the analysis of the neighbourhood effect itself. One motivation for the 
neighbourhood effect stems from the literature review. Immigration to certain regions can lead to better 
election outcomes for right-wing parties. However, none of the literature has measured how immigration 
to neighbouring regions affects the voting behaviour. Spatial econometric models allow to distinguish 
between the number of refugees in a municipality, i.e. the backyard effect, and the number of refugees in 
neighbouring municipalities, i.e. the neighbourhood effect. We are not only interested in the backyard 
effect on the voting outcome but also in the neighbourhood effect. Before we define the latter effect, we 
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require a plausible definition of neighbourhood. The most common way to implement a neighbourhood 
structure in the sense of spatial econometrics is the spatial weight matrix (Drukker et al. 2013a). The spatial 
weight matrix defines which spatial entities are neighbours. A common way to define a neighbourhood is 
a common border between two geographical units. If two municipalities i and j share a common border, 
the single element of the matrix 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 takes a value of one or zero otherwise. The binary neighbourhood 
relations among all spatial entities form a neighbourhood structure which is defined in a contiguous spatial 
weight matrix 𝑊𝑊.  
𝑊𝑊 = �𝑤𝑤11 𝑤𝑤12 ⋯ 𝑤𝑤1𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤21 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⋯ 𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛1 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛2 ⋯ 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
�   (2) 
With  
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �   1       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑗𝑗0       𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                    (3) 
The contiguous spatial weight matrix 𝑊𝑊 is an N x N matrix where the number of rows and columns 
corresponds to the total number of municipalities in our sample (N = 1,101). We define the diagonal 
elements of the matrix as zero. There are many possible definitions of neighbourhood, however, we use 
the common border contiguity definition.15 Wang, Kockelmann and Wang (2013) argue that variations in 
the spatial weight matrix setting do not significantly change parameter estimation. For the sake of 
simplicity, we follow this argument and restrict the model to one type of neighbourhood structure. The 
spatial weight matrix is the starting point for most spatial econometric models. An in-depth overview on 
spatial econometric models is provided by Anselin (1988), Elhorst (2010), and LeSage and Page (2009). 
There are three common ways to implement a spatial structure, i.e. the spatial weight matrix, into an 
econometric model, namely, in the dependent variable, in the independent variable, and in the error term. 
Implementing all three types of structure is unfeasible and leads to misspecification (Elhorst, 2010). LeSage 
and Page (2009) argue that implementing spatial structure in the dependent and independent variables 
results in unbiased coefficient estimates in a majority of cases. Potential spatial structure in the error term 
does not affect consistency, however, it improves estimation efficiency. LeSage and Page suggest 
                                                          
15 For example, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  can take the value of one, if two locations lie within a certain distance to another. Any other 
boundary measure can be taken as well. Another method is the implementation of an inverse distance, so that the 
neighbourhood is measured in terms of distance rather than connectivity. 
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estimating the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) with spatial structures in the dependent and independent 
variables. The SDM is defined as follows. 
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑊𝑊 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 + 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑋𝑋 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋 + 𝑣𝑣   (4) 
𝜆𝜆 is the spatial autoregressive parameter for the dependent variable and can be interpreted as the average 
effect of neighbouring vote shares. Note that 𝜆𝜆 is a scalar. When 𝜆𝜆 is positive, a high vote share for a party 
in municipality 𝑖𝑖 reinforces the vote share for the same party in neighbouring municipality −𝑖𝑖. 𝜆𝜆 is also 
positive, when a low vote share further weakens the vote share for the same party in neighbouring 
municipalities. In other words, a positive 𝜆𝜆 represents the degree of spatial clustering of similar values in 
the dependent variable at nearby locations.16 The parameters, 𝛼𝛼2 and 𝑊𝑊 constitute the spatial structure in 
the independent variables. Parameter 𝛼𝛼2 represents the average effect of neighbouring refugee 
accommodations on the initial community, i.e. the neighbourhood effect. The second parameter 𝑊𝑊 shows 
the average influence of neighbouring socioeconomic and policy variables. 𝑣𝑣 represents the error term. If 
there is no spatial structure in the independent variables, the parameters 𝛼𝛼2 and 𝑊𝑊 are insignificant. In 
that case, the Kelejian-Prucha Model (KPM) can improve estimation efficiency. The model omits the spatial 
structure in the independent variables but adds a spatial structure to the dependent variable and the error 
term. The KPM model is defined as follows. 
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼1 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 + 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑣𝑣 
With     
𝑣𝑣 = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑣𝑣 + 𝜀𝜀    (5) 
𝜌𝜌 is the coefficient which shows the average effect of neighbouring disturbances that improves the 
efficiency. Therefore, 𝜌𝜌 is considered a nuisance parameter. 𝜀𝜀 is an i.i.d. noise term. If there is no structure 
in the independent variable, but a spatial structure prevails in the dependent variables as well as the error 
term, the most efficient and consistent model is the Spatial Durbin Error Model (SDE). 
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼1 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑊𝑊 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋 + 𝑣𝑣 
With 
𝑣𝑣 = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑣𝑣 + 𝜀𝜀    (6) 
                                                          
16 The case of a negative 𝜆𝜆 is a rather exotic and less common case. 
62 
 
We follow the model selection procedure proposed by the literature and estimate three models for each 
party. First, we estimate a simple OLS model without any spatial interactions for both parties. Second, we 
estimate the SDM model from equation (4) for the parties to check the existence of the neighbourhood 
effect. As for the third model, we follow the model selection procedure proposed by LeSage and Page. We 
estimate equation KPM model from equation (5) by the generalised spatial two stage least squares 
estimator (GS2SLS) for the AFD party. Since we do not find significant spatial autocorrelation for CDU vote 
shares, we estimate equation (6) for the CDU party for higher efficiency. Ord (1975) and Anselin (1980) 
provide a detailed description for the GS2SLS estimation procedure. For estimation, we follow the 
procedure of Drukker et al. (2013b) in STATA 15. 
4.4 Refugee Allocation and Endogeneity 
There is some potential for endogeneity, primarily because refugee allocation is not a random process and 
depends on various factors itself. Following the literature as well as the allocation schemes, we identify 
five major factors that influence the refugee allocation, namely, (1) population density, (2) tax revenues, 
(3) presence of initial entry centres (IEC), (4) the vacancy rate, and the (5) political affiliation of the decision 
makers in the municipalities. The allocation of refugees follows different schemes depending on the 
administrative level. For instance, the allocation regime among states differs from the allocation among 
municipalities. The asylum seeker management is a top-to-bottom system. This means that the allocation 
starts at the highest administrative level (federal states), is then followed by the allocation among 
counties, and ends at the lowest administrative level (municipalities). In practice, every asylum seeker 
picked up at the German border undergoes a quick check by the border police followed by a registration 
in a federal asylum seeker database (EASY-System). The EASY-System assigns a number of refugees to each 
of the sixteen states based on a quota, namely, the “Koenigssteiner Schluessel”. The quota allocates 
refugees based on the state’s population and tax revenues and ensures a rather balanced distribution of 
the burden.17 Refugees assigned to a certain state are send to one of the large-scale initial entry centres 
(IEC) within the state, where the majority of the paperwork takes place. IECs are rather large housing-
facilities and provide short-term housing for several thousand refugees as long as immigrants are waiting 
for the asylum admission. Municipalities that operate IECs subsequently receive fewer refugees as 
municipalities without IECs. Hence, the number of immigrants correlates negatively with the number of 
IECs. After successful registration at the IEC, the refugees are redirected to the counties (Landkreise) within 
                                                          
17 The distribution rests to one third on the population and two thirds on tax revenues.  
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the same state. The allocation to counties follows the same quota.18 Finally, the authorities within the 
counties allocate the refugees to the municipalities, which ultimately provide middle- and long-term 
refugee accommodations. It is important to note that, in contrast to the allocation among states and 
counties, the quota is not obligatory for the allocation among municipalities. The allocation among 
municipalities mostly depends on the presence of IECs, the population density, and, most importantly, on 
the number of vacant flats and houses. The immigration influx happened in a short time span and suitable 
accommodations were scarce. House owners received a lucrative rent from the German government for 
hosting refugees. Consequently, municipalities with high vacancy rates have higher numbers of refugee 
accommodations.19 Hence, a high vacancy rate induces a self-selection bias. Finally, the refugee 
distribution could be affected by the party affiliation of the incumbent mayor. For example, the green 
party supports immigration and has a rather refugee-friendly stance. Hence, a green party mayor could 
decide to provide a larger number of refugee accommodations. We believe the last argument is somewhat 
controversial, because the decision of a mayor is not bound to the party leadership. Furthermore, hosting 
larger numbers of refugees voluntarily leads to a higher financial burden for the municipalities and could 
threaten the popularity of a mayor. As a result, it would be politically rational to oblige to the assigned 
immigration numbers without deviating. In order to deal with endogeneity, we run a regression where the 
number of refugee accommodations is a function of IECs, GDP, vacancy rate, and the political affiliation. 
Since tax revenue data is only available for a quarter of municipalities, we use regional variation in GDP as 
a proxy for tax income. Furthermore, we account for the influence of population by standardising the 
refugee accommodations per one thousand residents. For the political affiliation, we include a dummy 
variable which takes the value one if the mayor affiliates to the CDU party. Note that the majority of 
mayors have either no party membership or affiliate to the CDU, while not a single mayor affiliates to the 
AFD party and only few mayors are in other parties. The estimates are shown in table 4.2. The regression 
shows that the refugee allocation can be partly explained by initial entry centres and the vacancy rates. 
Both coefficients are significantly different from zero and in line with the official allocation procedures. 
IECs correlate negatively with refugee accommodations and the vacancy rate is beneficial for refugee 
settlement. Furthermore, we confirm that the refugee allocation is unaffected by variations in GDP. We 
also find that the political affiliation of the mayor does not affect the refugee allocation procedure. 
Although two variables are significant, the explanatory power of the regression is weak. Note that the 
coefficient of determination is quite low with 𝑅𝑅2 = 3.4%. In other words, the refugee allocation is not 
                                                          
18 The protracted registration procedure led to overcrowded IECs during 2015. Consequently, many applicants were 
redirected to the counties (Landkreise) before their application was completed. 
19 Note that existing houses and apartments which host refugees are also considered refugee accommodations. 
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completely random, but it is also little affected by the main four factors that can induce endogeneity. The 
variables are considered as the main drivers which could potentially cause a non-random allocation. 
However, they explain only a small proportion of the refugee allocation mechanisms.   
Table 4.2: Determinants of refugee allocation 
Dependent variable:  
Refugee accommodations 
per 1000 residents 
 
 
IEC  
 
 
- 0.027 *** 
(- 4.33) 
 
GDP 0.001 
(1.25) 
 
Vacancy rate 
 
3.977 *** 
(4.43) 
 
Mayor dummy (CDU) - 0.020 
(- 0.84) 
 
𝑅𝑅2   0.034 
N = 1,101   
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level of significance 
 
Although the estimates suggest that the bias caused by non-randomness is minimal, we control for it by 
adding the predicted values of the estimation from table 4.2 as a regressor (𝑦𝑦�) to the estimates in the 
following chapter. 
 
4.5 Results 
The aim of this paper is to study how immigration in voter’s neighbourhoods affects the rise of the right-
wing AFD party and the decline of Angela Merkel’s CDU party. We measure the influence of refugee 
immigration through two effects: the backyard effect (refugee presence) and the neighbourhood effect 
(indirect refugee presence). The coefficients 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2 represent the magnitude and direction of both 
effects respectively. The estimates for the AFD party are summarised in table 4.3. Regarding the first 
coefficient 𝛼𝛼1, we find strong evidence for the backyard effect on AFD vote shares. All three models 
indicate a positive influence of refugee presence on AFD vote shares. The magnitude of the coefficients 
varies slightly between 0.59 and 0.67.  
  
65 
 
Table 4.3: Estimates for the AFD vote share in the year 2016 in percentage points 
Dependent variable:  
AFD ’16 vote share 
 Standard 
(OLS) 
SDM 
(GS2SLS) 
KPM 
(GS2SLS) 
 
(1) Refugee variables 
    
 Backyard effect (𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏) 
  
 0.667 ** 
(2.47) 
 
0.594 ** 
(2.27) 
0.678 *** 
(2.99) 
 Neighbourhood effect (𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐) 
  
 - 0.046 
(0.06) 
- 
 
(2) Socioeconomic variables     
 AFD 13  
 
 1.087 *** 
(12.05) 
 
1.033 *** 
(15.41) 
 
0.878 *** 
(13.26) 
 Turnout rate  - 0.179 *** 
(- 7.14) 
 
- 0.170 *** 
(- 8.53) 
 
- 0.151 *** 
(- 8.34) 
 
 GDP 
 
 0.035 *** 
(2.85) 
 
0.024 
(1.66) 
 
0.024 
(1.55) 
 
 Unemployment  1.234 *** 
(7.47) 
 
1.094 *** 
(6.12) 
0.938 *** 
(4.80) 
 Mean age  - 0.472 ***  
(- 6.32) 
 
- 0.456 ***  
(- 7.64) 
 
- 0.415 ***  
(- 7.41) 
 
 Males  0.005   
(0.41) 
 
0.008  
(0.92) 
 
- 0.001  
(- 0.13) 
 
 Married  
  
 0.037 ***  
(7.23)  
0.039 ***  
(9.60) 
0.038 ***  
(9.81) 
 Population density  0.078 *** 
(2.81) 
 
0.066 **  
(2.04) 
 
0.102 *** 
(3.02) 
 
 Migrant background  0.002 
(0.96) 
0.002 
(0.96) 
 
0.003 
(1.39) 
 Low education 
 
 0.012 *** 
(4.43) 
 
0.012 *** 
(4.04) 
 
0.012 *** 
(3.84) 
 
(3) Spatial parameters     
 λ  - 0.010 *** 
(3.70) 
0.007 *** 
(3.10) 
 𝑊𝑊  -   - 
 
 𝜌𝜌  - - 0.094 ***  
(20.77) 
 𝑦𝑦�  5.521 *** 
(2.93) 
5.170 *** 
(3.52) 
4.377 *** 
(3.21) 
 𝑅𝑅2   0.42 - - 
 N = 1,101 
 *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level of significance 
 
The direction of the effect is clear: A higher refugee presence significantly boosts AFD vote shares. To be 
precise, one additional refugee accommodation per one thousand residents increases the AFD vote share 
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by 0.6 percentage points on average.20 We find a positive and significant spatial autoregressive structure 
in the dependent variable, which justifies the use of spatial econometric models. Both spatial models, SDM 
and KPM, indicate that the intensity of AFD vote shares is spatially clustered in certain regions. In other 
words, voters with AFD preference are likely to live in nearby municipalities. With regard to the second 
coefficient (𝛼𝛼2) we find no evidence for the neighbourhood effect on AFD vote shares. 
When it comes to the CDU, we do not find convincing evidence for the backyard effect (table 4.4). Although 
𝛼𝛼1 is negative in all models, it is only significant in the least likely model (OLS). Hence, refugee presence 
does not have a direct negative influence on the CDU vote shares. However, we find some evidence for an 
indirect influence, i.e. the neighbourhood effect. The SDM and SDE models confirm that refugee presence 
in neighbouring municipalities negatively affects the CDU election outcome. In addition, we have also 
conducted several robustness checks by including and excluding various regressors. In all of our variations, 
the direction and significance of both refugee effects remain unchanged and the coefficients vary slightly. 
Overall, we conclude that the influence of the immigration shock is rather robust for both parties. The 
backyard effect was beneficiary for the AFD party in the 2016 elections while the neighbourhood effect 
was disadvantageous to the CDU party.  
Regarding other policy variables, we find a strong positive correlation between the 2013 election outcome 
and the 2016 election outcome for both parties. Regions that had a high vote share for either party in the 
previous election have a similarly high vote share for the same party in the recent election. This indicates 
some regional and temporal stickiness of party preferences. For both parties, the control variables for the 
previous election, AFD 13 and CDU 13, exhibit the highest t-values among all variables. In fact, the previous 
election is the driving force for the high coefficient of determination for the CDU party. It explains nearly 
eighty per cent of the CDU vote share in 2016. Regarding the election turnout, we find that AFD voting is 
more pronounced in regions with traditionally high voting abstinence. In 2016, the AFD gained more votes 
in regions that had a low turnout rate in the 2013 election. On the contrary, CDU vote shares are higher in 
regions with low voting abstinence. This result indicates that right-wing voting is an attractive option in 
regions with a traditionally higher voting abstinence. The AFD is often considered a “catch all” party for 
protest voters. One alternative to protest voting is voting abstinence. Hence, it is possible that the party 
mobilised a significant share of non-voters which changed to the AFD party. Unfortunately, the AFD is a 
                                                          
20 The true coefficients in the SDM and KPM model will vary slightly since we have to account for a positive 
autoregressive structure (λ = 0.007 – 0.010) in the dependent variable. 
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relatively young party and extensive time series data of election results is not available. Hence, further 
studies should be conducted in the future to prove this hypothesis. 
Table 4.4: Estimates for the CDU vote shares in the year 2016 in percentage points 
Dependent variable:  
CDU ’16 vote share 
 Standard 
(OLS) 
SDM 
(GS2SLS) 
SDE 
(GS2SLS) 
 
(1) Refugee variables 
    
 Backyard effect (𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏) 
  
 - 0.604 * 
(- 1.91) 
 
- 0.334 
(- 1.14) 
 
- 0.113 
(- 0.43) 
 
 Neighbourhood effect (𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐) 
  
 - - 0.187 ** 
(- 2.22) 
 
- 0.184 ** 
(- 2.08) 
 
(2) Socioeconomic variables     
 CDU 13  
 
 0.934 *** 
(36.90) 
 
0.925 *** 
(52.75) 
 
0.910 *** 
(49.63) 
 
 Turnout rate  0.094 *** 
(3.40) 
 
0.096 *** 
(4.33) 
 
0.111 *** 
(5.25) 
 
 GDP 
 
 - 0.069 *** 
(- 5.29) 
 
- 0.063 *** 
(- 3.95) 
 
- 0.037 ** 
(- 2.01) 
 
 Unemployment  - 0.016 
(- 0.09) 
 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.122 
(0.54) 
 Mean age  - 0.046 
(- 0.49) 
 
- 0.045 
(- 0.67) 
 
0.034 
(0.52) 
 
 Males  - 0.014   
(- 1.08) 
 
- 0.014  
(- 1.49) 
 
0.003  
(0.30) 
 
 Married  
  
 - 0.025 ***  
(- 4.73)  
- 0.026 ***  
(- 5.71) 
- 0.024 ***  
(5.24) 
 Population density  - 0.053 * 
(- 1.64) 
 
- 0.042 
(- 1.15) 
 
0.015 
(0.37) 
 
 Migrant background 
 
 0.001 
(0.29) 
 
0.001 
(0.36) 
 
0.004 
(1.47) 
 
 Low education 
 
 - 0.002 
(- 0.50) 
 
- 0.000 
(- 0.02) 
0.007 * 
(1.91) 
(3) Spatial parameters     
 λ 
 
 - - 0.000  
(- 0.03) 
- 
 𝑊𝑊  - 
 
    
 𝜌𝜌  - - 0.088 ***  
(16.37) 
 𝑦𝑦�  3.471 * 
(1.69) 
3.802 ** 
(2.31) 
0.425 
(0.27) 
 𝑅𝑅2   0.81 - - 
 N = 1,101 
 *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level of significance 
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We find some interesting links between the socioeconomic environment and the election outcome. Our 
results show that right-wing voting is closely related to unemployment. This result is supported by the 
aforementioned literature. Among all models, the unemployment rate is positively correlated with AFD 
vote shares at the highest significance level. Unemployment has also a relatively high coefficient. On 
average, one additional percentage point in the unemployment rate increases the AFD vote share by 0.87 
to 1.08 percentage points. With regard to the municipality output, we find no significant relationship 
between regional GDP an AFD votes.  
Although GDP has a positive effect on AFD vote shares in the standard model, the OLS estimator is most 
likely biased, since it does not implement spatial structures. The better fitting models, SDM and KPM, show 
no significant influence of GDP on AFD vote shares. In contrast, the CDU party is unaffected by regional 
variation in unemployment. However, it exhibits significantly lower vote shares in wealthier regions with 
high GDP. Regarding other demographic factors, our estimates show that the AFD party obtained more 
votes in municipalities with a certain demographic milieu. The AFD party was more successful in 
municipalities with younger age, higher share of married couples, and a lower level of education. 
Moreover, the AFD received more votes in regions with higher population density. Surprisingly, the AFD 
election outcome is unaffected by the share of residents with immigration background. This group consists 
of people who live in Germany for a longer period of time, hold a German citizenship, and are entitled to 
vote. Due to the anti-immigration rhetoric of the AFD party, one could expect that Germans with migration 
background might averse the party’s position and vote against it. Hence, a high share of Germans with 
migration background could drive down the AFD votes. However, since we use aggregated data, the setup 
does not allow drawing conclusions on individual voting behaviour. Hence, this result could be the 
outcome of three scenarios. First, preferences for the AFD party of Germans with migration background 
do not differ significantly from those of native Germans. Second, higher exposure to Germans with 
migration background does not lead to higher AFD vote shares which would indicate that the voter 
population tolerates Germans with migration background. Third, Germans with migration background 
oppose the AFD party and native Germans oppose those with immigration background. However, both 
effects work in opposite directions and cancel each other out. Our research setup is unable to disentangle 
these effects which leaves space for further research.  
With regard to the CDU, there is no clearly-cut demographic environment, with the exception of married 
people, which has significantly higher CDU vote shares. Variation in age, gender, migration background, 
and population density do not affect the CDU election outcome significantly. We find some evidence for a 
positive correlation between a low education level and CDU votes in the SDE model. Overall, the results 
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for the CDU party are little surprising, since the CDU is Germany’s centre party which attracts voters from 
various social groups. We also do not find a spatial clustering for the CDU vote shares, which indicates that 
CDU voting is spatially dispersed. Finally, some remarks on the spatial model parameters. The Moran’s I 
test for spatial autocorrelation finds significant spatial autocorrelation in some of the independent 
variables as well as the error term. In addition, we find a positive autocorrelation of the dependent variable 
for the AFD party. Our estimates confirm the existence of spatial autocorrelation. Hence, we conclude that 
the OLS model is the weakest performing model among the estimates and all estimated spatial models are 
more consistent and efficient. 
 
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper studies the short-run impact of immigration on right-wing voting behaviour. We use the refugee 
crisis from 2015/2016 as a natural experiment to study the influence of a large and unexpected 
immigration influx on the voting behaviour in German municipalities during the 2016 election. We model 
the influence of immigration, directly and indirectly, through two channels, i.e. the backyard effect and 
the neighbourhood effect. The former effect measures the impact of refugee presence in municipalities 
on the election outcome while the latter effect measures the impact of refugee presence in neighbouring 
municipalities. Our estimates for the right-wing AFD party are straightforward - the party clearly benefits 
from the immigration influx since the backyard effect is positive and significant across all models. We find 
no evidence for the neighbourhood effect on AFD vote shares. Our results support the hypothesis that a 
significant share of the population opposed refugee settlement in their home municipality by voting for 
the right-wing AFD party. We suppose that voters in municipalities with larger numbers of refugee 
settlements found the AFD party program more appealing, since it opposes refugee settlement in Germany 
and criticises Merkel’s refugee policy. With regard to the massive loss of the CDU party in the election, it 
is surprising that local refugee presence did not directly affect CDU vote shares. Hence, other factors have 
caused the decline of Angela Merkel’s CDU. According to Haller (2017) the media coverage about the 
refugee crisis was one major factor which caused CDU vote shares to plummet. He argues that the 
subjective perception through media consumption was rather important to form an opinion about the 
matter and stimulated disagreement with the refugee-welcoming policy of the CDU. We do not prove 
Haller’s argument point in our work, however, it is a potential extension to our work in the future. Although 
we do not find evidence for the backyard effect on CDU votes, we do find some evidence that the 
neighbourhood effect negatively affects CDU vote shares. This is an interesting result because it implies 
that direct exposure to immigration does not decrease CDU votes while indirect exposure does. The 
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contact hypothesis might partly explain this observation. The hypothesis states that social interaction with 
immigrants can reduce prejudice and hostility. Having few migrants in the “backyard” while having many 
immigrants in the “neighbourhood” describes a situation where social interaction between natives and 
immigrants is potentially limited. Note that AFD and CDU voters are two different population segments. 
Contrary to AFD voters, CDU advocates could be more open to intercultural contact with refugees, which 
could reflect in an insignificant backyard effect but a significant neighbourhood effect. According to the 
contact hypothesis, intercultural contact can induce empathy and acceptance among different cultural 
groups. This would explain the insignificant backyard effect and the significant negative neighbourhood 
effect on the CDU. In other words, CDU advocates, who experience refugee presence in their hometown, 
also have a higher chance to become familiar with refugees and develop empathy and tolerance, while 
refugee presence in neighbouring municipalities physically limits intercultural contact. This would 
ultimately explain why the CDU received fewer votes in regions which neighbour municipalities with many 
refugee accommodations. This behaviour is also in line with the CDU party programme of 2016, which has 
a tolerant and integrative stance towards refugees. Furthermore, we find that CDU obtained more votes 
in regions which had higher turnout rates in the previous elections. In contrast, the right-wing AFD was 
more successful in regions, which had low turnout rates in the previous election. This indicates that the 
AFD party was more attractive in regions which previously had a higher voting abstinence. Another 
interesting result is the spatial clustering of AFD voters. The SDM and KPM models show that regions with 
high AFD vote-shares at the 2016 election are likely to be neighbour to other regions which prefer the AFD 
likewise. This is an interesting observation, because it raises the question why right-wing voting is spatially 
clustered. There seems to be some sort of “contagion effect” of right-wing voting among neighbouring 
municipalities. This result leaves some space for further research. However, one potential explanation 
could be the public perceptibility of the AFD in regions where the AFD is strong. Regions with higher AFD 
vote shares have more AFD supporters and therefore, more financial means and manpower. This allows 
more party advertisement and a professional structure. Since the AFD party is a new party, it is all the 
more important to make a professional impression on voters, which is evidently easier achievable with 
solid party funding. We assume that the “professional” AFD presence is perceived in the neighbourhood 
which attracts voters in neighbouring municipalities. It would be interesting to study the role of party 
funding on election results in a spatial context to check this hypothesis. 
The analysis of the socioeconomic environment shows that unemployment is a major driving factor for 
right-wing voting. The AFD clearly benefitted in regions with higher unemployment rates. A large share of 
the literature on that matter points out that right-wing voting is often reinforced by a high unemployment 
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rate. With regard to the demographic factors, we find strong evidence for AFD support in municipalities 
with high degrees of married couples, low education, and lower mean age. In light of German history, a 
recent study shows that political extremism is the second largest concern among Germans in 2015 (RAV, 
2016). We presume that the fear of political extremism is pronounced more strongly among older voters. 
Hence, older generations might be less willing to vote for right-wing parties. Another surprising result is 
the seemingly indifferent stance towards right-wing voting in regions with many Germans with 
immigration background. We cannot say whether immigrants in Germany have the same stance towards 
“new” immigrants as native Germans do or whether native Germans’ voting behaviour is not affected by 
the presence of Germans with immigration background. As a final conclusion, the finely-scaled spatial 
methodology proofed to be useful to study the influence of local immigration shocks and local 
socioeconomic conditions on voting behaviour since it outperformed the non-spatial model. It could serve 
as a useful template for future policy evaluations of various local shocks and spatial clustering of voting 
behaviour. 
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5 General Discussion and Conclusion 
This work studies spatial data analysis techniques in economics and illustrates these techniques in three 
applications. In the articles, we employ techniques from exploratory spatial data analysis such as maps of 
spatial distributions, measures from spatial statistics such as Moran’s I, and spatial econometric models 
for regression analysis.  
The first article (chapter two) explores the determinants of electronic gambling machine (EGM) supply in 
the state of Baden-Württemberg. We use municipality level data to assess the influence of socioeconomic 
determinants on the EGM density, i.e. the number of EGMs per thousand residents. Our results suggest 
that the EGM supply is significantly higher in regions with higher rates of unemployment, immigrants, and 
lower levels of education. Hence, the EGM supply is more likely to occur in a certain socioeconomic milieu 
rather than being independent from socioeconomic factors. For the model selection we have chosen a 
simple OLS approach because the test statistics do not indicate the existence of spatial dependence. This 
is presumably due to a rather incomplete sample. We restrict the sample to 244 municipalities from a total 
number of 1,101 municipalities, because some data is not available for small municipalities, which 
constitute more than seventy percent of the population (figure 5.1). Hence, we include twenty two per 
cent of the available municipalities which results in a holey sample.  
 
Figure 5.1 : Municipalities in Baden-Württemberg. Complete sample N=1.101 (left side),  
and incomplete sample N=244 (right side). 
Thus, a lot of the contiguous neighbourhood structure is missing resulting in an incomplete spatial weights 
matrix which does not fully represent the complexity of the neighbourhood structure. However, the spatial 
weights matrix is required for spatial autocorrelation/dependence testing. Furthermore, the incomplete 
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sample consists of several “islands”, i.e. regions which do not share a common border with other regions, 
while the complete sample has no islands. Too many islands in the sample lead to a higher number of 
regions which are excluded from potential spatial interaction. As a result, the tests for spatial dependence 
are insignificant. From a methodological point of view, the first article highlights the necessity of a 
complete sample for meaningful spatial econometric analysis. Compared to other econometric 
techniques, spatial econometric models build upon spatial dependence, which heavily relies on the 
completeness of the neighbourhood structure among geographical entities.  
The article also highlights the trade-off between data availability and completeness in spatial data analysis. 
For instance, we could obtain a complete sample which covers all neighbourhood relations, if we used 
data from a higher aggregation level, i.e. counties. Figure 5.2 shows a total of 44 counties (Landkreise and 
Stadtkreise) in Baden-Württemberg in comparison to the incomplete sample of 244 municipalities. It 
illustrates a complete neighbourhood structure of counties, where all areas are linked together – directly 
and indirectly. On the other hand, the 244 municipalities represent a larger sample in terms of 
observations, but does not exhibit a contiguous neighbourhood structure. Hence, higher aggregated data 
can be a solution to the island problem.  
  
Figure 5.2: A total of forty-four counties (left) and 244 municipalities (right)  
in Baden-Württemberg 
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At the same time, higher aggregated data changes the scope of research and reduces the number of 
observations from 244 observations to 44, which affects estimation efficiency. Furthermore, the 
coefficients might change completely because the true data generating process at a higher aggregation 
level might be different compared to lower aggregation levels. This problem is known as the Modified Area 
Unit Problem (MAUP), which indicates that the outcome of a geographical analysis changes, if the 
aggregation level or scope of perspective changes (Fischer and Wang, 2011). Although data at higher 
aggregation levels is a convenient way to deal with the island problem and obtain a completely contiguous 
sample, it often suffers from the MAUP problem. There is no definite solution to this issue, however, 
alternative definitions of the spatial weights matrix (e.g. k-nearest neighbours) and better data availability 
for small-scale regions can soothe the issue (Gibbons and Overman, 2012). 
The second article (chapter three) studies the spatial distribution of EGM supply while controlling for 
socioeconomic factors in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). Using data from NRW 
resolves a majority of the aforementioned data issues which were present in the first article. The NRW 
sample consists of 396 municipalities and contains records for socioeconomic factors and EGM supply data 
for nearly all municipalities. Hence, the analysis contains a complete sample, which is also at a low 
aggregation level. The fine scaled data does not suffer from the island-problem and biased spatial 
dependence tests. A first view at the relative EGM supply map, i.e. the EGMs per thousand residents, 
shows that EGM supply is rather high in certain neighbouring regions (hot spots), while it remains low in 
other neighbouring regions (cold spots). The aim of this work is to analyse the market concentration and 
link it to the socioeconomic environment within the municipalities.  
The article introduces two novelties: First, it visualises the spatial distribution of EGM supply, and 
illustrates spatial clustering of EGM supply in NRW. Second, since Moran’s I statistics and the LM test 
indicate the presence of spatial dependence, it is feasible to use spatial econometric modelling. The main 
findings imply that there is a clustering of EGM supply across regions at first, but when controlled for 
socioeconomic differences across the regions, the clustering effect is erased. In other words, the social 
and economic factors explain most of the supply concentration among municipalities. The results are 
partially in line with the first article. For instance, we find a higher EGM supply in regions with lower degree 
of education and higher unemployment rates. However, the link between unemployment and EGM supply 
is not as significant as in the first article. We also find that there is a higher gambling activity in urban 
regions compared to rural areas. Furthermore, we find some evidence for higher EGM supply in regions 
with motorway service station (MSS), which indicates that gambling activity is partially linked to passing 
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traffic. In conclusion, the state of NRW is a suitable sample for further spatial socioeconomic research, 
because it has well documented data for nearly all municipalities. 
The third article studies the influence of immigration on local election outcomes during the 2016 refugee 
crisis. To be precise, we analyse how variations in refugee settlement affected the election outcomes in 
the municipalities during the 2016 BW state election. The analysis focuses on two parties of interest, 
namely, the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AFD), and Angela Merkel’s conservative ruling party, 
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). It is the first study which applies spatial econometric techniques 
and combines small-scale immigration data, election data, and a set of socioeconomic factors for a 
complete sample of 1,101 municipalities in Baden-Württemberg. In contrast to the first article, our sample 
covers all municipalities in Baden-Württemberg. Hence, there are no issues regarding the island problem. 
We thereby obtain a correctly specified spatial weights matrix and meaningful spatial dependence tests. 
One novelty compared to the previous articles is the use of spatial lags in the independent variables, which 
are incorporated in the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM). Since we find significant spatial interaction in the 
dependent as well as some independent variables, the SDM model is the best fitting model for our purpose 
(LeSage and Pace, 2009).  
Regarding the results, we find that right-wing voting is a local phenomenon. This means AFD vote shares 
are highly clustered in certain regions and the clustering still sustains in the SDM model, which controls 
for several factors. There are two important conclusions from this study. First, there are strong spill-over-
effects in right-wing voting. However, we do not explore the reasons, why right-wing voting is 
concentrated in certain regions. Hence, the determinants of AFD clustering remain an open question, 
which should be further studied. Second, we find a significant positive relationship between refugee 
settlement and AFD vote shares. This result supports the hypothesis that local refugee presence 
strengthened the AFD party. Furthermore, we find that the AFD party was popular in regions with lower 
turnout rates, higher GDP, higher unemployment rates, lower mean age, higher share of married people, 
and lower degrees of education. Regarding the CDU party, the results towards immigration are not as 
clear. The direct influence of immigrants turns out insignificant. Considering the disastrous election 
outcome for the CDU, it is surprising that “backyard” refugee presence didn’t play a role for the election 
outcome. The CDU lost roughly a quarter of its votes and local refugee presence didn’t contribute to it. 
However there are negative spill-over-effects from neighbourhood immigration on CDU votes. In other 
words, immigration to neighbouring municipalities negatively affects the CDU voting outcomes. We do not 
deepen this observation, however, the causes for this effect should be further explored. When it comes to 
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the socioeconomic milieu, the CDU was preferred in regions with higher turnout rate, lower GDP, and a 
higher share of unmarried people.  
Regarding the interpretation of the results, it is tempting to draw conclusions about individuals. For 
example in this setup, it is not possible to state that the average AFD voter is either unemployed, young, 
married, has a low degree of education, or is a combination of these attributes. Since spatial data analysis 
in this work is based on area data, it is not possible to trace the estimated outcomes back to individuals. 
Conclusions about individuals will cause the ecological fallacy problem (King, 1997). The problem describes 
that statements about individuals, which are based on aggregated data, will be either biased or infeasible. 
There are some solutions to the ecological fallacy problem, such as King’s EI approach (King, 1997). 
However, these methods have not been incorporated in spatial data analysis yet and should be further 
studied and implemented in statistical software.  
Although spatial data analysis has become increasingly popular among economists within the last years, it 
has some disadvantages compared to non-spatial econometrics and leaves room for improvement. For 
instance, causal inference is still an issue for applied spatial econometricians. One reason for that stems 
from the ecological fallacy problem. Since conclusions on individuals are not feasible from aggregated 
data, the applicability for micro-level analysis is rather limited. Another issue for causal inference is 
described by Gibbons and Overman (2012). They argue that the spatial lag in the dependent variable and 
the error term cannot be separated which leads to identification issues. This is due to the fact that spatial 
autocorrelation in 𝑌𝑌 and spatial autocorrelation in something unobserved cannot be distinguished. Hence, 
there should be more theoretical considerations which explains why certain spatial structures occur. 
Moreover, some of the important spatial standard literature, such as LeSage and Pace (2009), either 
downplay or ignore the causality issue. This leads to a significant number of publications based on this 
literature, which avoids serious discussions about causality in spatial models. One reason for that is the 
traditional understanding of populations and samples. Usually, statistical inference assumes that there is 
an unobserved population, which can be studied by drawing samples from that population. However, since 
spatial data analysis often uses samples which correspond to the whole population, as we did in article 
two and three, one can assume that no inference from the sample is required because the population 
itself is studied.  
In view of this criticism, it is clear that model selection and causality issues in spatial econometrics need 
more revision. However, these issues have partially been addressed and refuted by recent publications. 
Bramoulle et al. (2009) present a set of assumptions, which have to be fulfilled in order to identify the 
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Spatial Durbin Model correctly. Vega and Elhorst (2015) study model specifications of the SLX model, while 
Paelinck and Mur (2018) review causality issues in spatial data analysis in general. These articles show that 
methodological issues are addressed and further developed. Despite all the criticism, most economists 
agree with the basic idea of the discipline, which stems from Tobler’s first law of geography: near things 
are indeed more related than distant things. Ignoring these structures in applied work will result in biased 
estimates. Finally, we should not underestimate the role of spatial data visualisation and pattern 
recognition. Visualising spatial data makes otherwise complex issues easier to grasp and spatial pattern 
recognition allows to detect and locate economic activity. Hence, the techniques are valuable for applied 
research and didactical purposes likewise. 
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